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THE FULL PROTECTION AND
SECURITY STANDARD IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
WHAT AND WHO IS INVESTMENT
FULLY[?] PROTECTED AND SECURED
FROM?
NARTNIRUN JUNNGAM*
Foreigners, as long as they live in alien territory, ought to be safe from
every injury, and the ruler of the state is bound to defend them against it,
that is, security is to be assured to foreigners living in alien territory.
- CHRISTIAN WOLFF'
The international duty of a government in respect of the property of
foreigners cannot be dissevered from its international duty in relation to
foreigners in other respects. It is, at least, difficult to suggest that a
different standard of duty applies for the security of property and for the
security of persons.... But the duty of a government towards individuals
in respect of their property varies with each successive stage of
civilization; it is not the same in the modern world as in ancient or
medieval societies, nor is it the same in all countries [today]. A lawmaker
should hesitate long before decreeing any absolute rule as a dogma exempt
from the relativity which is the condition of human organizations.
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1. Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Scientifca Pertractum (1749), in 2 CLASSICS OF
INT'L L. 536 (Joseph H. Drake trans., James Brown Scott ed., 1934).
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- JOHN FISCHER WILLIAMS 2
The axis of this Article is a preferred interpretation and application of
the full protection and security ("FPS") standard in contemporary
international investment law. By carrying out the intellectual tasks of
jurists proposed by the New Haven School of International Law, its
findings are that the FPS standard covers both physical and legal harms
to investments caused by state organs and/or third parties and that due
diligence is decisive for determining the observation of the standard. To
write up these findings, the Article first repudiates the conventional
wisdom that the FPS standard owes its origin to treaties offriendship,
commerce, and navigation ("FCN") concluded in the nineteenth century.
It then relies on a historical analysis to refute the position that the FPS
standard has historically applied exclusively to physical harms. It
argues that the concept of the FPS standard since its genesis has been
tied with legal protection, notably, administration ofjustice, and such a
tie has not necessarily been established upon physical harms. Thus,
based on the customary international law duty to provide foreigners with
full protection and security, one is justified in interpreting the treaty-
based FPS standard to cover legal harms that are even more delicate and
wider in scope, given the context and conditions of international
investment. By finding that the FPS standard covers legal harms, its
overlap with the fair and equitable treatment ("FET") standard occurs
and blurs their distinction in practice. Regardless of whether physical
and legal harms are caused by state organs or by third parties, this
Article advocates for a modified objective test of due diligence to
determine whether host states comply with the FPS standard. To hold
that the acts of state organs are wrongful as such without enquiring
whether such organs were diligent or not is unconvincing on its own
terms and not even consistent with the minimum standard of treatment.
Host states' economic, social, and political realities bear relevance to
their compliance with the FPS standard in both physical and legal
contexts. Absence of due diligence is a contextual conclusion based on
an assessment of what is "due" in the actual context. Therefore, host
states can fail the due diligence test without intending to cause harms
(dolus).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The full protection and security ("FPS") standard' is one of the "non-
contingent" or "absolute" standards of treatment, a standard that is not
dependent on the host state's treatment of other investments or investors.4 It
has been guaranteed in most international investment treaties, typically in
the form of a full protection and security clause. Although its textual
expression varies from treaty to treaty, "protection" and "security" are
usually at its core. Traditionally, this standard has been construed as obliging
host states to adopt measures protective of investments and investors from
physical harms. In this respect, the standard is not especially nebulous.
Subsequently, it has been expanded to cover legal protection and security for
investments and investors, that is, in the case of infringement of the
investors' rights. If the applicable FPS clause refers explicitly to full
protection and legal security,' such an expansion is nothing more than a
result of a textual interpretation that is neither "ambiguous or obscure" nor
"manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 6 However, if the standard were crafted
in a broad and general fashion as containing, for instance, "full protection
3. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles oflnternational Law Considered
from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 7 (1957); Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117
RECUEIL DES COURS 66 (1966) (both explaining the traditional and justified distinction
among "rule," "standard" (crystalized rule), and "principle"); see Spyridon Roussalis v.
Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 10, 321, 609 (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf; Christoph
Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT'L DisP. SETTLEMENT 353, 358 (2010)
(both exemplifying the interchangeable use of "standard" and "principle" in investment
materials); Maurice Mendelson, The International Court of Justice and the Sources of
International Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 63, 79-80 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice
eds., 1996) (providing the ICJ's view regarding the interchangeability of "rule" and
"principle").
4. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 247 (2007); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 229 (2010); GUIGUO WANG, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHINESE
PERSPECTIVE 263 (2015).
5. See, e.g., Treaty on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
art. 4(1), Arg.-Ger., Apr. 9, 1991, 1910 U.N.T.S 198.
6. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLTI.
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and security," then the interpretative issue related to its coverage arises and
provokes discussion. Although investors have frequently invoked the
standard,' regarding it as serving their objectives better,8 host states have
been opposed to its extended scope. Given this conflict, international
investment tribunals maintain different perspectives. As a result, the
jurisprudence on the FPS standard is highly controversial. This observation
is not an exaggeration. One arbitral tribunal even acknowledged that the FPS
standard has been "diversely interpreted" by its fellow tribunals.9 From an
academic perspective, even now, the standard has known no consensus.'o
Thus, it is essential to clear a path through the tangled jurisprudence
constante of international investment tribunals to systematically address this
standard of treatment.
A prima facie examination of such jurisprudence highlights the core
question of this Article as to whether it is appropriate to expand the so-called
conventional coverage of the FPS standard, which has traditionally been
limited to physical protection against violence, to include legal and
regulatory protection and stability? Two seminal cases initially analyzed this
7. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Evolution of the Full Protection and Security
Standard, in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF
ICSID 319-20, 329 (Meg Kinnear et al. eds., 2016); United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review
37, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4 (2005). But see Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full
Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131 (August
Reinisch ed., 2008) (noting that the FPS standard is less frequently applied than other
standards of investment protection).
8. JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2005).
9. Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award, ¶ 535
(Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl272.
pdf
10. See WANG, supra note 4, at 309 (observing that "[t]here is no consensus in
arbitration practice on its interpretation and application, however"); see also Ralph
Alexander Lorz, Protection and Security (Including the NAFTA Approach), in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 764, 781 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015) (noting
that "[t]he arbitral tribunals are highly divergent on this matter"); Moss, supra note 7, at
142 (admitting that "[t]he question remains rather controversial"); STEPHAN W. SCHILL,
THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 79 (2009) (noting that
the exact content of the FPS standard "has not been authoritatively determined and
remains contested"); SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 67 (2008) (noting that "[t]here is no generally
agreed definition of this term and different parties have claimed different levels of
protection under this [FPS] principle"); Elizabeth Whitsitt & Nigel Bankes, The
Evolution ofInternational Investment Law and Its Application to the Energy Sector, 51
ALTA. L. REV. 207, 231 (2013) (noting that "[s]ome of the most contested issues with
respect to the standard of full protection and security are whether or not it extends beyond
the physical security of the investor or its investment is compromised, its relationship to
other substantive disciplines within IIAs, and its relationship to customary international
law").
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question: Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka" and CME Czech
Republic B. V. v. Czech Republic.'2 While the former applied the FPS
standard to physical violence, the latter extended its scope to cover legal
infringement of investment. To this day, both arbitral decisions have had
persuasive authority on subsequent tribunals' consideration of the standard.
A second question relates to the precise degree of protection and security:
how full is full enough for protection and security? Should the FPS standard
continue to entail an obligation of due diligence or an obligation of conduct
in every case, or should it give rise to strict liability in certain cases?
To answer these questions, this Article tries to take on the five intellectual
tasks of jurists put forward by the New Haven School of International Law:
1. Goal clarification-an end sought to secure-is a preferred
interpretation and application of the FPS standard that serves its very
purpose.
2. A trend analysis is used to examine the degree to which an interpretation
and application of the FPS standard has been achieved in past decisions and
performs a historical function that identifies and organizes trends in pertinent
past decisions in terms of the application thereof.
3. A factor analysis warrants the correlation of past decisions with
conditions that influenced them and a consideration of whether the context
of those conditions has changed materially and pertinently.
4. Predictions, possibly made by different techniques, are used to see the
future results of actors' election. Surveying different decision options and
scrutinizing the prospective aggregate-value consequences of each in terms
of an interpretation and application of the FPS standard allow jurists to select
and adjust specific recommendations in order that they may increase the
probability of the eventuation of a preferred future.
5. Invention of alternatives and recommendations is not merely a summary
of the rules of the past. Instead, it involves exploration of alternative
arrangements to increase such probability. 3
Although the protection and security of persons and property in
international investment treaties in its broadest sense can be found in more
than one context, this Article will focus only on the FPS standard as it is
manifested in the form of FPS clauses and, thus, it will refrain from
examining specific clauses in other relevant contexts-for example, access
11. ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 50 (June 27, 1990),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital034.pdf
12. UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 107, 119, 132, 474 (Sept. 13, 2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0178.pdf
13. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International
Law, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118, 123-24 (1992).
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to courts and international tribunals, expropriation, and compensation.1 4 Its
discussion proceeds as follows: Part II offers a historical development of the
FPS standard. It examines how the early concept of the standard was formed
in various contexts and ultimately crystalized into the contemporary FPS
standard. Part III presents an understanding of the FPS standard from
scholarly and judicial perspectives at both the domestic and international
levels, considering how scholars, domestic courts, and international courts
and tribunals have approached the FPS standard. Specifically, Part III
examines judgments of the United States Supreme Court and decisions by
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal ("IUSCT"). Part IV focuses exclusively on the interpretation and
application of the FPS standard by investment tribunals under ad hoc
arbitration pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitrations Rules and institutional arbitration,
such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID Centre"), the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA"), the London
Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"), and the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce ("SCC"). It systematically categorizes all salient arbitral findings
about the FPS standard as follows: the treaty-based FPS standard and
customary international law; its nature of protection and security; the
materiality of terminological variations; its scope ratione materiae, its scope
ratione personae, and its relation to other standards and principles in order
to see a cumulative application of standards and principles of international
investment law." Part V offers an overarching analysis and several
recommendations with respect to the genesis of the FPS standard,
terminological variations, covered harms, covered perpetrators, due
diligence, and the relation between the FPS standard and customary
international law, as well as, the fair and equitable treatment ("FET")
standard.
II. A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY
STANDARD
As is rightly said, "[a] lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic,
a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may
venture to call himself an architect." 6 This part of our trend analysis is thus
14. ROBERT RENBERT WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-07 (1960).
15. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 69-70.
16. Vaughan Lowe, Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONORS OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS XV, XV
(Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) (quoting WALTER SCOTT, GUY
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devoted to the historical development of attitudes toward and treatment of
foreigners, the granting of protection and security in various treaties, the
emergence of the customary international law that provides protection and
security, and, ultimately, the inclusion of modern FPS clauses in investment
and other treaties. It presents a historical account, arranged chronologically,
of full protection and security in both economic and political contexts
according to the following timeline of five historical periods: Greece, Rome,
the Middle Ages, the Renaissance to World War I, and World War I to the
present. The core of this Section aims to illustrate that the FPS standard is
rooted deeper in legal history than has been estimated by previous literature,
which reports that the FPS standard's origin can be traced back to the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 7  Actually, it dates to at least
ancient Greece, if not further. Moreover, this Section will show that since
its very beginnings, the concept of protection and security has not been
limited only to physical protection and security.
A. Greece
Foreigners in Greece included Greeks of other cities domiciling in a state,
Greek travelers or visitors staying in a state temporarily, and "barbarians"
(non-Hellenes). The Greek's initial antagonism toward foreigners was
eventually mitigated by commercial exigencies and war followed by
subsequent peaceful adjustments and alliances." Inter-Greek treaties,
normally in the form of political conventions, granted personal liberty and
protection of property to their parties' citizens, allowing them, inter alia, to
acquire real estate. Punishment for treaty violation was also introduced
therein. The "isopolity" treaties of the Greeks, which allowed for the
reciprocal granting of citizenship, placed citizens on roughly the same
footing as nationals.' 9 Where such treaties did not exist, it was still possible
for citizens of one Greek state to receive equal rights or special protection
from another state by virtue of their sense of kinship.2 0
MANNERINGch. XXXVII (P.D. Garside ed., 1839)).
17. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 161 (2d ed. 2012); SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 69-70, 302 n.40 (2009); SALACUSE, supra note 4, at 231;
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States,
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 203-04 (1988).
18. 1 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME 125-26 (1911) [hereinafter 1 PHILLIPSON].
19. Id. at 140-42; ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
5-6 (1954).
20. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 6.
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Despite their having treaties with Greece, non-Hellenic communities were
regarded as barbarians destined to become enemies and slaves, and Greece's
wars against them were once considered by Aristotle as a hunt and as "just
by nature." 2 ' Nonetheless, non-Hellenes were not without legal status and
protection. Legally recognized foreigners who resided permanently in
Greece and formally registered as such, called metoikoi, received full
juridical protection (i.e., access to courts) while having neither political
rights nor a right to acquire real estate.22 Unless prohibited by treaties,
Greeks could launch private reprisals against the property of foreigners who
were accused of wrongdoing or enact androlepsia against their fellows.
Foreign judges were permitted to participate during foreign litigation.23
Foreigners were also protected by the institution of proxenia, in which a
proxenos, a prominent Geek or foreign citizen, was officially entrusted by a
foreign state or a protecting state with protecting its citizens. This institution
was often regarded as the earliest form of consulate authority.2 4
Eventually, restrictions against foreigners in Greece were gradually
removed, and most Greeks were in favor of foreigners.25 As a result,
foreigners received protection and large concessions in most Greek states,
especially in Athens. Free foreigners' persons and property and ransomed
prisoners of war were each protected. In addition to proxenia, foreigners
were also protected by the institution of private and public hospitality
(hospitium privatum and hospitium publicum). Entered into by foreigners
and their hosts, such hospitality was held to be a sacred bond to be passed
from father to son.26 The positive attitude toward foreigners underlying such
protection was well-recorded. In the Odyssey, Homer wrote that "strangers
and the poor came from Zeus [and] suppliants were under his special
protection," and as Alcinous asserts to Odysseus, "[A]nyone with even a
moderate share of right feeling is fully aware that it is his duty to treat a guest
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 8; 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 141 (discussing reprisals and androlepsia
in Greece); 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 349-366 (1911) [hereinafter 2 PHILLIPSON].
24. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 6-7; 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 149-52;
Wolfgang Preiser, History of International Law, Ancient Times to 1648, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 11, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e716?rskey=sCXBAE&result=4&prd=EPIL (last
updated Aug. 2008).
25. See 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 128-32 (stating that Greeks not only liked
foreigners, but in most Greek states, laws protected foreigners' persons and property).
26. Id. at 148-49.
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and a suppliant just as though he were his own brother."2 7 There was also a
law sanctioning citizens who denied foreigners' requests for accommodation
after sundown; a table reservation and a prioritized meal-serving order for
strangers at common meals; and public imprecation against those found
liable for not showing the way to travelers who had strayed.28 Various
hostelries were established in Greece where food and shelter were available.
These included inns, stopping places, lodgings, guest chambers, resting
places, and the like.29 According to The Laws, Plato's longest dialogue,
"arbitrary offences committed against strangers were liable to the vengeance
of the gods ... the foreigner having no kindred and friends is all the more an
object of sympathy both of gods and men."30 Notably, foreigners enjoyed
freedom of speech and movement, the latter of which could not be exercised
at places reserved for citizens' performance of their sacred rites.3  in
addition, foreigners were given leave to freely exercise their national form
of worship.32
As noted earlier, although granted official protection by a patron under
Athenian law, the metoikoi had no right to own immovable property unless
authorized to do so by a special decree. Nonetheless, their other interests
concerning their persons and property were guaranteed by the Athenian
government, even when they were temporarily absent. Only when they were
exiled was their property confiscated.33 For non-domiciled aliens, their
persons and property received adequate protection as well.3 4
B. Rome
According to Phillipson, the Romans had less national pride than the
Greeks, and their attitude toward foreigners "was marked by less
exclusiveness and greater liberality of a systematic character than that of the
Greek race."35 As Nussbaum also observes, "one may say that in
contradistinction to the Greeks, the Roman did not live in a state of latent
hostility with the rest of the world."36 Only in its prehistoric times did they
27. Id. at 131.
28. Id. at 132.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 136.
32. Id. at 169.
33. See id. at 145-46, 166, 172.
34. Id. at 146-47.
35. Id. at 213.
36. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 12 (footnote omitted).
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consider every stranger to be an enemy or hostis.37
Foreigners in Rome were legally protected, having some independent and
dependent juridical capacity. For the former, they could exert it on their
own. For the latter, they needed intervention through explicit pacts,
conventions, or treaties to make it applicable and effective.38 Foreigners
received protection from their Roman patrons, who took care of their general
interests pursuant to private hospitality, an institution borrowed from the
Greeks. By this purely voluntary, reciprocal, and hereditary guest tie,
foreigners were guarded by their protector if they were ill, were cremated if
dead, and were advised as well as assisted if involved in legal proceedings.
They were regarded as sacred and putting them to death was a heinous crime
that was as serious as parricide.39 Such private hospitality was extended by
a public hospitality. 40 Accordingly, when residing in Rome, foreigners
received, inter alia, a gratis lodging, utensils necessary for showering and
cooking, gifts of gold or silverware, clothing, arms, and horses. This public
hospitality was of great importance for the protection of foreigners, since it
served as the foundation of the provisions in subsequent treaties and
represented "the minimum of mutual rights and obligations laid down in an
international compact." 4 1
However, barbarians (or alienigen), as potential enemies, were not in the
adequate confines of legal protection from the cradle to the grave. Denied
admission to Roman territory on a regular basis, they were only rarely
allowed to be in Rome, and when they were, they could do so only by an
extraordinary concession on a case-by-case basis or occasionally by special
compacts that allowed them to settle only in certain areas. Their commercial
relationships with Romans were largely restricted. Theoretically, they did
not receive any rights whatsoever, nor were they underjus gentium but rather
inherent subjugation. Notably, their property was without protection,
considered to be res nullius that might be acquired by anyone through simple
occupation. If defeated, they might be enslaved. When buried, barbarians'
graves received less protection than those of slaves and were not res
religiosa.4 2 Similarly, dediticii, conquered people who were degraded to this
status, had only as much political and civil capacity as their conquerors
conferred upon them. Their former rights and privileges were taken away,
37. 1 THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: FROM THE
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA, 1648 44 (1899) [hereinafter 1 WALKER].
38. See 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 213-14.
39. See id. at 218-19.
40. 1 WALKER, supra note 37, at 45.
41. 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 225-26.
42. Id. at 230-31.
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and they themselves, along with their things, human and divine, such as
arms, cities, territory, temples, and property, were at their conquerors'
disposal. However, for both alienigen and dediticii, broader conceptions and
accommodating practices enabled them to receive better treatment than what
the law prescribed.4 3
As for ordinary peregrines, or free subjects, comprised primarily of
subjects from foreign states with friendly ties to Rome, they remained
theoretically outside the confines of Roman civil jurisprudence, or ius civile,
unless there existed subsequent extensions or conventions granting them
special concessions.44 They did not have political rights or the most
important private rights. 45 Among the rights denied to them were the right
to vote, the right to marry, and the right to inherit ab intestato.46 They could
not claim jus commercii and its corollaries, that is, quiritary ownership,
except in case of provincial land and certain modes of property acquisition.4 7
If granted commercium, they would have the right to enter into bilateral
arrangements to acquire, hold, and transfer all manner of property pursuant
to civil law.48 If commercium was not granted, their daily intercourse,
including commercial, was still possible under the regulations of a special
magistrate, praetorperegrinus.49 The creation of this magistrate in 242 B.C.
marked official Roman recognition of foreigners' status, executing their
litigation through appointed judges.o As a more permanent, comprehensive,
and effective jurisdiction, the praetor peregrinus was created to protect all
classes of peregrines, serving a similar function as the xenodikai did in
Greece." The rights of peregrines whose cities had entered into treaties with
Rome would be even more secure. Latin peregrines, for example, could
enjoy recuperatiojus commercii, and jus connubii while in Rome.5 2 These
peregrines occupied and enjoyed "an intermediate juridical position between
the Roman citizens and peregrins proper" in accordance with the class they
belonged.53
Later, treatment toward ordinary peregrines was ameliorated by jus
43. Id. at 232.
44. Id.
45. See id. (explaining that the Roman system was limited to only citizens).
46. Id. at 233-35.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 234.
50. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 13.
51. 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 267.
52. Id. at 240.
53. Id.
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gentium, comprising its new provisions and jus praetorium. In the event that
the provisions of jus gentium were not enough to protect them substantively
and procedurally, their law of origin (lex peregrinorum) could apply. In
other words, peregrines were protected by certain Roman civil provisions by
way of express extension, jus gentium, 5 4 and lexperegrinorum. Thus, their
private rights regarding marital and family matters were recognized. Jus
gentium, the evolution of which symbolizes Roman openness to foreigners,
allowed them to acquire property through its various modes and enjoy rights
in rem as well as in personam. As to their procedural protection, they were
allowed to submit criminal claims of the civil law, such as theft and damage
to property.55 Protection of property had long been regarded as being
included in jus gentium.56 Romans also established recuperatores to
consider foreigners' disputes, as was the praetorperegrinus.5 1
C. The Middle Ages
Alien residents during the Middle Ages received different but somewhat
lenient treatment depending on their countries of residence and the prevailing
policy. In some countries, foreigners were protected in life and limb and
entitled to appear before ordinary courts. 5 ' As suitors, they received the
privilege of a jury de medietate linguae, having both fellow foreigners and
citizens listen to their cases.59 Care provided by a special host remained in
60practice.
Articulate legal rules were not always necessary to ensure the safety of
foreigners' persons and goods. 6 ' Unwritten customs evolved and served
their purpose well. Reference to such customs can be found, for example, in
a letter written by Emperor Charlemagne to the king of Mercia in 796 in
which Charlemagne assured protection for the king's merchants in
accordance with "ancient custom of commerce."62 In return, Charlemagne
requested equal protection for his merchants in Mercia; should they be the
victims of injustice, local rulers and courts should give them redress. 63 This
54. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 14.
55. Id. (including laws regarding marriage, property, and damages into jus gentium);
1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 235-39.
56. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 14.
57. 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 267.
58. 1 WALKER, supra note 37, at 119.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 27.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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generally represented a unilateral grant of franchise effective in protecting
merchants and their goods.64 Considered a "man of the Emperor," foreign
merchants were gladly welcomed by rulers, who physically defended them
from attacks while taxing them in an appropriate and proportionate manner. 65
Legally, they could come from a foreign land to claim the heritage of their
ancestors upon a payment of tax, otherwise known as a droit de detraction.66
In case of their own death, "it commonly happened that the vultures of the
Crown swooped down once more, and robbed the alien heir under the name
of the droit d'aubaine."67
Foreign merchants in England benefited from statutes enacted to comfort
and protect them. In times of peace, they could enter and leave the country
without hindrance. Their transactions were without disturbance. 68 When
acting as a plaintiff or a respondent, their fellow countrymen were included
on their jury.69 "In one particular alone was English law strict against the
alien. He might hold and acquire personal property within the realm, and
maintain a personal action; but he was forbidden property in real estate." 70
Still, at the forefront of foreigners' concern was the use of reprisals.7 ' As
an obnoxious legal institution, reprisals were eventually suppressed by
autonomous legislation and treaties that were more developed than those
applicable in Greece.72 Foreseeing possible danger caused by their subjects'
reprisals, rulers, particularly those in Italy, found it necessary to control
reprisals, enacting legislation that conditioned reprisals on government
authorization. 73  Known in English as a "letter of reprisals," such
authorization would be permitted if statutory requirements were fulfilled and
only for the recovery of a specified amount.74 Besides private reprisals, there
existed town-to-town reprisals that were prohibited by the British Parliament
in 1275.'" As Walker describes:
Amongst the special risks of his trading the merchant stranger of the
Middle Ages numbered the liability to attachment in person or property in
64. See id.
65. 1 WALKER, supra note 37, at 119.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 120.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 121.
71. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 25.
72. See id
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 25-26.
14 Vol. 7:1
FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD
respect of the debts of a defaulting fellow-countryman, and the liability to
the exercise of reprisals. Accordingly, by a statute of Edw. III, it was
enacted that a Lombard company should be responsible for the debts of
any of its merchants left unpaid within the realm, "o that any merchant,
"which is not of the company, should not be thereby "grieved or
impeached." And the grant of special reprisals, being the formal
authorisation [sic] by his sovereign of a person judging himself wronged
by a foreign power to indemnify himself by the seizure of property
belonging to any subject of that power, was no uncommon occurrence. 76
Internationally, Italian governments led in concluding treaties that
restrained reprisals. Legislations and treaties for this purpose had something
in common, requiring claimants to have suffered denial of justice in foreign
countries where they first presented their claims. By the end of the Middle
Ages, a foreigner's protection and security was improved when the practice
of private reprisals was abandoned, thereby strengthening the safety of the
foreigner's person and goods, a condition indispensable for both the
exchange of goods and for rulers' financial improvement through collection
of duties and fees from foreign merchants.
Apart from legislations and treaties suppressing reprisals, the Middle Ages
witnessed other legislation, institutions, commercial comity of nations, and
treaties protective of foreigners in general and of foreign merchants in
particular. 79 For instance, the code of the Visigoths in 654 allowed foreign
merchants to settle disputes among themselves using their own magistrates
and law.so Such legislation increased in number in the last three centuries of
the era and included the Magna Carta of 1215, the Carta Mercatoria of 1303,
and the Statute of the Staple of 1353."
On the Continent, Emperor Frederick II's Authentica Omnes peregrini of
1220 conferred upon all foreigners the freedom to dispose of their property
by contract of will.82 This famous, but futile decree, abdicated local rulers'
right to seize foreigners' property upon death (i.e., jus albinagii, droit d'
aubaine).8 3 Enhancing protection of foreign merchants in such places as
Champagne and Lyons, elaborate franchises, given by the state and the
church, provided foreign merchants with procedural protection by
76. 1 WALKER, supra note 37, at 121.
77. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 25-27.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 28.
80. Id.
81. Id.; Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 22.
82. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 29.
83. Id.
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establishing mercantile courts. 8 4 "Furthermore, permanent mercantile courts
frequented by foreign parties appeared about the middle of the twelfth
century in Italian city-states (Milan, Pisa) and later in other Mediterranean
trade centers such as Narbonne and Barcelona."85
Medieval guest courts (so-called Gastgerichte) were also established in
German towns for similar purposes.8 6 Because of its great achievements and
influence, the Hanseatic League was able to secure extensive franchises in
important markets, thereby strengthening safety for persons and goods and
the freedom of commerce and navigation. 7 The conditional right to have
buildings for personal and commercial purposes, landing places, churches,
and graveyards were also established." Diplomatic protection, as an
institution of modem public international law since the Middle Ages, was
also exercised by countries, with variations in terminology and concept, to
protect their mistreated nationals in other countries.89 One example of
commercial comity of nations is the granting of protection and privilege to
the men of Cologne by Richard I of England in 1194.90 Commercial treaties,
especially inter-Italian ones, contained provisions regarding safe
communication, travel, and stay,9' even granting protection to certain
foreigners by way of national treatment ("NT") and most-favored-nation
("MFN") clauses. 92
D. The Renaissance to World War I
Protection and security of foreigners and their property was continually
improved, mainly through treaties, custom, and municipal law. As a typical
example of a political-commercial treaty, the Intercursus Magnus of 1496
between England and the house of Burgundy, which then controlled the Low
84. See id. at 21-22, 29.
85. Id. at 29.
86. Kay Hailbronner & Jana Gogolin, Aliens, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB.
INT'LL. ¶ 9, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10. 1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-978019
9231690-e744?rskey=BQqpok&result= 1 &prd=EPIL (last updated July 2013).
87. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 34.
88. Id.
89. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 522 (7th ed. 2008).
But see CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION 8 (2008) (noting
that there existed no recorded examples of possible exercise of diplomatic protection
before the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries).
90. See GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (1928) (stating that they were permitted to trade freely and did
not have to pay London tolls).
91. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 32.
92. Id. at 33.
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Countries, together with its alteration, the Intercursus Malus of 1506,
assured the subjects of the contracting parties the protection of their lives,
property, and commercial activities.93 From the late 1570s to the early
1580s, generally recognized commercial custom led the rulers of the Low
Countries to extend their protection to all Portuguese merchants doing
business with Lowlanders, rendering those merchants more secure from all
injury. Even in time of war, such merchants were not without protection.94
As Grotius explains:
When the situation at home grew unsettled, the States-General of the
Low Countries provided documentary ratification of the arrangement in
behalf of the Portuguese merchants, with the specific purpose of
safeguarding the latter from the adverse treatment that might be accorded
them under the pretext of war-time license. Thus the Portuguese, with
their wives, their children, and the other members of their household, were
taken under the guardianship of the state, as were their domestic
furnishings, merchandise, other possessions and all rights properly
pertaining to them, regardless of whether or not they were present in
person. For they were empowered to enter, depart from, or remain within
the territory of the Low Countries, and to import or export their
merchandise, by land or by sea. Orders were even given to all of the
military commanders and soldiers, instructing them to safeguard the
personal welfare and the goods of Portuguese dwelling in the said
territory. Moreover, after the Lowlanders had repudiated the rule of
Philip, and the Portuguese, on the other hand, had acknowledged his
sovereignty, with the result that the two peoples became enemies, that
same States-General (acting at the request of the Portuguese who were
residing or doing business in the Low Countries, and moved by the
consideration that it was to the interest of the natives that commerce
should be cherished in security rather than impeded by war), nevertheless
confirmed its earlier rescript and exempted the Portuguese from the laws
of war to the extent indicated in the following provision: that all
Portuguese who might wish to do so, should without danger to life or
property enjoy safe passage to and from, residence, and the practice of
commerce, among the people of the Low Countries. 95
Turning to the relation between Oriental and European rulers in the
sixteenth century, their treaties-the so-called capitulations-conferred
upon foreign merchants the right to settle their disputes under their specific
93. BUTLER & MACCOBY, supra note 90, at 213-15.
94. 1 HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE
LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 173-74 (James Brown Scott ed., Gwladys L. Williams &
Walter H. Zevdel trans., 1950).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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laws and usages and the freedom of religion.9 6 Again, at the outbreak of war,
foreigners, as enemy individuals, as well as their property, were protected by
treaties of commerce that were concluded in this period.9 7  Because of
increasing hostilities, protection and security in time of war was more
valuable than protection and security in time of peace.98
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, foreigners were not favored by
states' customary law, either substantively or procedurally. Enemy
individuals might be imprisoned or violently expelled, and their property,
personal, real, or mercantile might be confiscated. In addition, their debtors
might be released and their locus standi in civil courts removed.99 It was
treaties of commerce, the number of which had increased significantly in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that saved them from such
treatment. 00  In the France-Savoy treaty of 1713, for instance, the
confiscation of enemy property was no longer tolerated.' 0
In the second half of the eighteenth century, full protection and security
was not a novel concept. As Butler and Maccoby noted, several treaties of
commerce and navigation of the century "protected more fully the person
and property."102 To illustrate, the Russia-Naples Treaty of 1787 permitted
enemy subjects to finish their business in one year, free of government
interference with their property removal.1 03 Other treaties further permitted
enemy aliens to continue their peaceful residence and exempted their assets
from seizure. In the United States-Prussia Treaty of 1785, a period of nine
months after the declaration of war was granted to merchants for similar
purposes.1 04  More importantly, it also contained "brief and cryptic
reference" to protection of foreign merchants, providing that "the citizens or
subjects of either party . . . shall be received, protected, and treated with
humanity and kindness." 05 Later, the United States was more elaborate on
this point as evident from Article XIV of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce,
and Navigation between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of
96. Hailbronner & Gogolin, supra note 86, ¶ 9.
97. BUTLER & MACCOBY, supra note 90, at 222.
98. Id. at 197.
99. Id. at 196.
100. Id. at 196, 222, 488.
101. Id. at 197.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 197-98, 218.
105. George K. Foster, Recovering "Protection and Security": The Treaty Standard's
Obscure Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1095, 1118, 1118 n.6 (2012) (citing Treaty of Amity and Commerce, art.
XVIII, Prussia-U.S., Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84).
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1794, in which merchants and traders on each side received "the most
complete protection and security for their commerce."'0 6  With few
exceptions, this trend of leniency toward enemy persons and property
continued in the nineteenth century. 0 7 Another important theme in treaties
concluded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the abolition of
the droit d'aubaine.'os Modem diplomatic protection was also exercised in
the late eighteenth century, when the authorizations of private reprisals
disappeared.' 09  Notably, in the seventeenth century, the concept of
protection and security in foreign affairs clearly went beyond physical
protection of persons and property, though this extension might be limited to
certain types of persons and property. Such a concept sometimes included
the protection of reputation. This is evident in the earliest municipal law on
persons of diplomatic status of the Netherlands in 1651, which prohibited:
[ Offending, damaging, injuring by word, act or manner, the
ambassadors, residents, agents, or other ministers of the kings, princes,
republics, or others having the quality of public ministers; or to do them
injury or insult directly or indirectly, in any fashion or manner whatever,
in their own persons, gentlemen of their suite, their domestic servants,
dwellings, carriages, etc., under penalty of being corporeally punished as
violators of the law of nations and disturbers of the public peace.110
Later, especially since the period of the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815),
numerous instruments commonly (albeit loosely) called commercial treaties
inherited from preceding treaties what may be called an "international bill of
rights.""' Consequently, the nationals or subjects of both parties to treaties,
when in the territory of the other contracting party and when in compliance
with the laws and regulations of the country, usually enjoyed freedom to
enter and depart the country and settle in it, full protection and security for
their persons, goods, and property, free sojourn, admission and
establishment, protection from discriminatory treatment in taxation and the
like, free access to courts, freedom of worship, and exemption from military
service.1 2
106. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation art. 14, U.K.-U.S., Nov. 19, 1794,
8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
107. BUTLER & MACCOBY, supra note 90, at 198.
108. Id. at 198-99.
109. BROWNLIE, supra note 89, at 522.
110. JOHN P. GRANT & J. CRAIG BARKER, THE HARVARD RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ORIGINAL MATERIALS 94 (1966).
111. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 204.
112. See id. (emphasizing the reciprocity of rights citizens of contracting states enjoy);
1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION AND TREATIES 356 (1922) [hereinafter 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE]
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Particular provisions for the protection of persons and private property
rights in those commercial treaties were normally found in more than one
context, commonly occurring in contexts relating to "(1) access to courts, (2)
embargoes and detentions, (3) general statements as to protection and
security, and (4) specific references to expropriation and compensation."" 3
For the last context, the exact phrases used in such statements in the
nineteenth century included "'special protection' of private property,"114
"special protection to the persons and property of the citizens of each
other,""5 "constant protection and security,"116 "the most constant protection
and security for their persons and property,"'17 "the most constant security
and protection for their persons and property and for their rights,""' "the
same security and protection that is enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of
each country shall be guaranteed on both sides,"'' 9 "full and complete
protection and security,"120 and "full and perfect protection for their persons
and property."121
Suffice it to say that it was in the nineteenth century that the FPS standard,
though various in its expression, was widely included as a regular clause in
"Treaty of Friendship and Commerce," "Treaty of (Friendship), Commerce,
and Establishment," or "Treaty of (Friendship), Commerce, and Navigation
(FCN)' 22-the new titles reflecting the fact that other non-commercial
matters had also been included therein.' 23 Its concept accounted for strong
states insisting on obtaining the right of extraterritoriality to protect their
nationals' persons and property in the territory of weak ones.12 4
An example of the interpretation of FPS clauses in the nineteenth century
that went beyond physical protection and security can be found in An
(limiting reciprocal rights to citizens who respect the laws of their own country).
113. WILSON, supra note 14, at 106-07.
114. Id. at 106.
115. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation art. X, Chile-U.S., May 16, 1832,
8 U.S.T. 434.
116. WILSON, supra note 14, at 109 n.68.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Treaty with Borneo, art. 3, Bomeo-U.S., June 23, 1850, 10 U.S.T. 909; WILSON,
supra note 14, at 111 n.74.
121. Id.; 2 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1941)
[hereinafter 2 HACKWORTH] (quoting Treaty of Commerce and Navigation art. 1, Jap.-
U.S., Nov. 22, 1894); WILSON, supra note 14, at 106.
122. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 204-05.
123. MONTT, supra note 17, at 67.
124. 2 HACKWORTH, supra note 121, at 528.
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Additional and Explanatory Convention to the Treaty of Peace, Amity,
Commerce and Navigation of 1832 between the United States and Chile of
1833. In Article II of the 1833 Additional and Explanatory Convention, the
parties clarified the meaning of the FPS clause that appeared in Article X of
the original Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1832 as
follows:
It being agreed by the [tenth] article of the aforesaid treaty, that the
citizens of the United States of America, personally or by their agents,
shall have the right of being present at the decisions and sentences of the
tribunals, in all cases which may concern them, and at the examination of
witnesses and declarations that may be taken in their trials .... 125
Apart from FCN treaties, there are other relevant treaties that should not
be overlooked. Treaties concerning the residence of foreigners, concluded
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though small in number, laid
down the residence conditions of nationals of one state in the territory of the
other state.1 2 6 Of particular relevance, they also granted such nationals free
access to courts and constant and complete protection and security for their
person and property.1 27 Treaties relating to emigration that were made during
the same period should also be mentioned because of their protection of
emigrants.1 28  Peace treaties produced similar effects. For example,
according to the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ended the Spanish-American
War, the United States held Cuba under a trust relation for the inhabitants of
the island, thus exercising the powers and functions consistent with its
"duties as a trustee for the protection and security of persons and
property."1 29
E. World War I to the Present
From the nineteenth century to the World War I period, the FPS standard
still secured its place in commercial treaties that had continuously increased
in number. 30 However, the war years (1914-1918) had seen the departure
from the standard, since the practice regarding enemy aliens and property
125. An Additional and Explanatory Convention to the Treaty of Peace, Amity,
Commerce and Navigation art. 2, Chile-U.S., Sept. 1, 1833, 8 Stat. 434, T.S. No. 40
(emphasis added).
126. See 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, supra note 112, at 360-62 (providing
examples of countries that agreed to provide foreigners rights via treaties).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 328, 331-32 (originating with emigration resulting from the African
slave trade).
129. 1 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (1940)
[hereinafter 1 HACKWORTH].
130. See 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, supra note 112, at 357.
2018 21
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESSLAWREVIEW
was understandably more severe. Enemy aliens were imprisoned or expelled
for security and strategic reasons in most belligerent states, while enemy
property was placed under a custodian and frequently liquidated.' 3 '
The situation was improved at the end of the war. As part of a series of
the peace treaties of 1919 and 1920 that put an end to World War I, Article
277 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, for instance, contains the provision
that "[t]he nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in
German territory a constant protection for their persons and for their
property, rights and interests, and shall have free access to the courts of
law."'32 Actually, the rest of the treaties in the series all provide for "the free
enjoyment and protection of the life and liberty of all inhabitants."1 3 3
Similarly, Article 10 of the 1919 convention that revised the General Act of
Berlin of 1885 and the General Act of Brussels of 1890 provides that "[t]he
Signatory Powers acknowledge their obligation to maintain in the regions
under their control actual authority and police forces sufficient to insure
protection for persons and property and, if the case should arise, freedom for
commerce and transit."1 34 In the context of League of Nations mandates
elaborated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the FPS
standard was not disregarded. Each mandatory was required "to secure to
all nationals of states members of the League the same rights as are enjoyed
by its own nationals with respect to entry into and residence in the territory,
protection, acquisition of property, exercise of professions and trades, transit,
and complete economic, commercial, and industrial equality."1 3 5
Thereafter, an FPS clause remained a regular part of treaties but with more
clarification; the parties to the treaties more explicitly determined the degree
of the FPS standard. For instance, besides granting "the most constant
protection and security for their persons and property" to the nationals of
each party, Article I of the United States-Germany Treaty of 1923 also
referred to "that degree of protection that is required by international law."1 36
This type of FPS clause was later included in other treaties. 137 Again, as was
131. BUTLER & MACCOBY, supra note 90, at 198.
132. Treaty of Peace with Germany art. 277, June 28, 1919, Ger.-Gr. Brit., T.S. No.4
(1919) (Cd. 153) [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]; see 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE,
supra note 112, at 355.
133. WILLIAm EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (A. Pearce
Higgins ed., Oxford Univ. Press 8th ed. 1924).
134. 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 129, at 403.
135. Id. at 122.
136. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights art. I, U.S.-Ger., Dec. 8,
1923, 44 Stat. 2132.
137. 3 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 630, 653
(1942) [hereinafter 3 HACKWORTH].
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the situation in the seventeenth century, an understanding of protection and
security in international relations of this period was not limited to physical
concerns. Under the title "Personal Protection and Security," Article 17 of
the Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
includes interference with security, peace, or dignity in the concept of
protection and security.1 38
Shortly after World War II, the FPS standard remained able to save its
place in commercial treaties and the failed multilateral trade treaty. Its
significance was also evident in international relations as a new
government's intention to provide "adequate protection of foreign property
under international practice" was critical for considering whether
recognition of that government should be granted.1 3 9
The first post-World War II treaty between the United States and China of
1946 adopted, as its predecessors had, "the most constant protection and
security." However, "that degree of protection that is required by
international law" was changed to "the full protection and security required
by international law."1 4 0  The object of protection of the standard was
clarified by a separate provision that defined "property" as including
"interests held directly or indirectly,"141 which by 1957 had become a general
understanding and standard practice of the United States.142 Still, such a
terminological change connecting full protection and security with
international law did not make its way to all treaties. As is the case with the
U.S.-Uruguay Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Economic
Development, the degree of protection and security was still connected with
the national treatment standard. 143 Placing great emphasis on protection and
security for property, this treaty also contained a separate clause dealing
especially with property. 144 So did the U.S.-Ireland Treaty.1 4 5 As Wilson
concluded, the "most constant protection and security" for property was
included in all postwar treaties that the U.S. signed up to the end of 1958,
except for the treaty with Muscat, in which "all possible protection and
security" was used. Only four of its treaties-those with China, Italy,
Ireland, and Iran-link the degree of protection specifically to international
138. GRANT & BARKER, supra note 110, app. 4, at 449.
139. 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 129, at 232.
140. WILSON, supra note 14, at 116.
141. Id. at 117.
142. Id. at 120.
143. See id. at 118.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 119.
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law. 146
Multilaterally, the abortive Havana Charter of 1948 intended to establish
the International Trade Organization ("ITO") also contained an obligation to
grant "adequate security for existing and future investments."1 47
In 1959, the FPS standard was incorporated into the first bilateral
investment treaty ("BIT") specifically designated for investment protection,
the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments of 1959. Its Article 3(1) reads
"[i]nvestments by nationals or companies of either Party shall enjoy
protection and security in the territory of the other Party."1 48 Since then, the
protection and security of investment has been an intrinsic part of numerous
BITs and other international investment agreements ("IIAs").1 49 Article
10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty1o and Article 11(1), (2)(b), of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") Comprehensive
Investment Agreement ("ACIA") 15 serve as good examples.
The proliferation of investment treaties, especially BITs, was
accompanied by a corresponding lack of uniformity. The FPS standard's
exact formulations and patterns vary from treaty to treaty. "Full protection
and security,"152 "full security and protection,"1 53 "full and complete
protection and security,"1 54 "most constant protection and security,"15
146. Id. at 119-20.
147. Havana Charter art. 12 ¶ 2(a)(i), U.N. Doe. E/Conf.2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948).
148. Treaty for Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 3(1), Ger.-Pak., art. 3(1),
Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 23.
149. SALACUSE, supra note 4, at 233; KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 244-47 (2010).
150. Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100 ("Such
Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting
Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such Investments
be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by international law, including
treaty obligations.").
151. ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, art. 11(1)-(2), Feb. 26, 2009
("Each Member State shall accord to covered investments of investors of any other
Member State, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. (2) For
greater certainty: ... (b) full protection and security requires each Member State to take
such measures as may be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of
the covered investments.").
152. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 2(2), Tanz.-
U.K., Jan. 7, 1994, T.S. No. 90.
153. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 3 ¶
2, Czech-Neth., Apr. 29, 1991, 2242 U.N.T.S. 205.3(2).
154. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 4(3),
Fr.-Mex., Nov. 12, 1998.
155. Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100.
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"broad and full protection and security,"156 "full protection and legal
security, "151 "full physical protection and security," 5  "full legal
protection,"159 "full protection,"160 "adequate protection and security,"161
"protection and constant security" 16 and "protection" 16 are illustrative of
this diversity in treaty language.
It should be noted, too, that besides the "full protection and security"
clause, some BITs also contain the "full protection" clause in a separate
article at the beginning of the treaty. For instance, while Article 2(3) of the
Czech-Germany BIT requires that "[i]nvestments and revenue arising hereof
and in the event of their re-investment such revenue shall enjoy full
protection," its Article 4(1) further provides that "[i]nvestments by investors
of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection and security in the
territory of the other Contracting Party."1 64 Even in the complete absence of
"full protection and security" and the like, the FPS standard can still be part
of investment treaties. An equivalent of such a phrase is, for example,
"[i]nvestments ... shall be fully and completely protected and safeguarded"
or "[e]ach Party shall protect . . . investments."1 6 5 In terms of its scope
156. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 5(1),
Fr.-Peru, Oct. 6, 1993, 1980 U.N.T.S. 105.
157. Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art, 4(1), Arg.-Ger., Apr. 9,
1991, 1910 U.N.T.S. 198.
158. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art.
3(1), Neth.-Rom., Oct. 27, 1983.
159. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 2.2,
Mong.-Russ., Nov. 29, 1995; Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments art. 3(2), Arg.-Mex., Nov. 13, 1996, 2033 U.N.T.S. 1-35107.2.2.
160. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 4(1), Egypt-
Italy, Mar. 2, 1989.
161. Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among
Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference art. 2.2, June 5, 1981.
162. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 2(2), Arg.-U.K.,
Dec. 11, 1990.
163. Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments art. 3(1), P.R.C.-Laos, Jan. 31, 1993.
164. See Treaty for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments art. 4(1),
Czech-Ger., Oct. 2, 1990; see also Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments art. 2(3), 4(1), Italy-Leb., Nov. 7, 1997 (emphasis added)
("Each Contracting Party shall protect within its territory investments made in
accordance with its laws and regulations by investors of the other Contracting Party and
shall not impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension, sale or liquidation of such investments ...
"[i]nvestments by investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection and
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.").
165. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 5(1),
Arg.-Fr., July 3, 1991, 1728 U.N.T.S. 281; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
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ratione tertiis, the FPS standard applies in the territory of the other party or
in the territory and maritime area of the other contracting party.1 66
In some investment treaties, the FPS standard has been referred to as a
separate and independent standard.1 6 7 In others, it has been explicitly tied to
general or customary international law-disallowing protection and security
that is "less favourable than that required by international law" 168 or not "in
accordance with international law"1 69-and/or supplemented by the national
treatment and the most-favored-nation treatment.1 70 In still other investment
treaties, the FPS standard has clearly been treated as a core element of the
minimum standard of treatment,' 7 as is the case, for example, with Article
1105 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), captioned
as "Minimum Standard of Treatment."1 72 For greater clarity, the three parties
to NAFTA have stated in their binding interpretation note that "full
protection and security" contained in Article 1105 is nothing more than a
reflection of customary international law.1 73 Thus, it is not an autonomous
treaty norm that requires more than what is required by the minimum
Protection of Investments art. 3(1), Arg.-Spain, Mar. 10, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 187.
166. See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
art. 4(3), Fr.-Mex., Dec. 11, 1998; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments art. 5(1), Peru-Fr., Oct. 6, 1993, 1980 U.N.T.S. 105.
167. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 2,
Tanz.-U.K., Jan. 7, 1994, U.K.T.S. No. 90 (1996) (Cm. 2593).
168. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100.
169. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Jan. 1, 1994,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
170. See, e.g., Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments art.3(2), Neth.-Czech, Apr. 29, 1991 ("More particularly, each Contracting
Party shall accord to such investments full security and protection which in any case shall
not be less than accorded either to investments of its own investors or to investments of
investors of any third State, whichever is more favourable to the investor concerned.").
171. See R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 238 (June
29, 2012).
172. NAFTA art. 1105(1).
173. Glob. Affairs Can., Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 1] Provisions,
Gov'T CAN. (July 31, 2001), http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/NAFTA-
Interpr.aspx?lang=eng&_ga=2.79003799.2006136802.1507650265-
675927542.1507650265 (clarifying that the "fair and equitable treatment" and "full
protection and security" standards provided in NAFTA Chapter 11 "do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens").
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standard,1 74 nor is it a "free-standing obligation." 7 5
Similarly, the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement clarifies that
the FPS standard merely requires the level of police protection in accordance
with customary international law.1 76  Also for clarification, but in the
opposite direction, some treaties specifically refer to both protection and
legal security as falling within the scope of the FPS standard, as is the case
with the Germany-Argentina BIT of 1991.7 In addition, host states'
provision of full protection and security is not merely for determining their
observation of the FPS standard per se. It is also for the purpose of
determining the lawfulness of expropriation carried out by the host states.
This is because the parties to investment treaties expressly condition such
lawfulness on compliance with the FPS standard. 1' Regarding its exception,
the FPS is not applicable in certain circumstances, for example, war, armed
conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection, or riot
in the territory, as the parties agreed.1 7 9
174. See Clayton v. Can., PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, ¶¶ 432, 441 (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287
(holding that the "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security"
standards are not above and beyond requisite minimum standards).
175. See Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award,¶128 (June 26, 2003) (explaining that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection
and security" are not a "free standing obligation").
176. See Free Trade Agreement art. 11(5), Aus.-U.S., May 18, 2004, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 4759; see also Free Trade Agreement art, 10.5, C.A.-Dom. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 5, 2004,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 1307 ("For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of
treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of 'fair and equitable
treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive
rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide ... (b) 'full protection and security'
requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required under customary
international law."); Free Trade Agreement art. 10.4, Chile-U.S., June 6, 2003, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 2738 (clarifying that security standards and fair treatment standards "do not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do
not create additional substantive rights").
177. Treaty on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 4(1),
Arg.-Ger., Apr. 9, 1991, 1910 U.N.T.S. 171.
178. See Treaty on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
Ecuador-U.S., arts. 11(3), 111(1), Aug. 27, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-15; see also
Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶
342(D) (June 2, 2010); Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision on Reconsideration and Award, ¶¶ 155, 163-166 (Feb. 7, 2017).
179. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments art. 4(3), F.R.G.-Zim., Sept. 29, 1995, http://investmentpolicyhub.unc
tad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1453; Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments art. 7(1), Switz.-Zim., Aug. 15, 1996, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4837.
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Beneficiaries or objects of protection of the FPS standard in investment
treaties can be investors and/or investments, depending on the parties thereto.
"Investment" has regularly been adopted as corresponding to "property" in
commercial treaties.'s Now, "property" is of more historical importance.
Modeled on the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment
Abroad but with a number of modifications,"' the 1962 Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") Draft Convention on
the Protection of Foreign Property, adopted in 1967, contains in its Article 1
each party's obligation to accord within its territory "the most constant
protection and security" to "the property of the nationals of the other
Parties." By "property," it means, as Article 9(c) defines, "all property, rights
and interests, whether held directly or indirectly."' 82 Such a definition is
consistent with customary international law and international law as applied
by international courts and tribunals.' 83 And by "the most constant
protection and security," it refers to "the obligation of each Party to exercise
due diligence as regards actions by public authorities as well as others in
relation to such property."18 4  For the relation between "property" and
"investment," the former includes, but is not limited to, the latter.8 5 In other
words, "investment" is currently used as pars pro toto.1 86
Besides investment treaties containing FPS clauses, the period after World
War II witnessed human rights instruments that concern, in their own context
and fashion, investment protection. Although their primary purpose is not
to protect investment, their relevance to investment protection cannot be
denied.8 7 For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
endorses, inter alia, security of person, the right to own property, and non-
arbitrary deprivation of property. With binding force, Article I of the
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
180. A.Z. El Chiati, Protection ofInvestment in the Context ofPetroleum Agreements,
204 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 79 (1987).
181. Antonio R. Parra, The Convention and Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 374 RECUEIL DES COURS 315, 326 (2014).
182. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
114 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1969).
183. See id. 114, 157 (using "property" as an example that includes "all property,
rights and interests whether held directly or indirectly").
184. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DRAFT
CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 9 (1962) [hereinafter OECD].
185. Id. at 43.
186. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 182, at 157.
187. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 455
(1995).
188. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 3, 17 (Dec.
10, 1928).
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Fundamental Freedoms (Protocol I of 1952) provides that "[e]very natural
or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of
international law."'8 9 Common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights
recognizes a collective right of "all peoples" to "freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources."' 90 The beneficiaries of such recognition
include both aliens and nationals within the state parties' territory and subject
to their jurisdiction.' 9 ' Providing for aliens' fundamental human, economic,
and social rights, the Declaration on Human Rights of Individuals who are
not Nationals of the Country in which They Live of 1985 prohibits, for
instance, the subjection of aliens to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment and arbitrary deprivation of aliens' lawfully acquired assets.1 92
III. THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD AS ADDRESSED BY
SCHOLARS AND APPLIED BY COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
The preceding historical account reveals states' long law-making practice
of utilizing the FPS standard in conducting their international relations. This
Section will deal with the standard from academic and law-applying
perspectives, considering the relevant legal literature and judicial decisions
that touch upon protection and security of foreigners and their property,
which is the converse way to describe responsibility of states for injuries to
foreigners.1 93 Its purpose is to examine the degree to which an interpretation
and application of the FPS standard has been accomplished in pertinent past
decisions to see trends therein.
A. Scholarly View
1. Protection and Security in General
One reasonable and prevalent answer to the question of why it is essential
189. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1940, E.T.S. No. 009, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents
/Convention_ENG.pdf
190. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
191. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 909 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (1905).
192. G.A. Res. 40/144, arts. 6, 9 (Dec. 13, 1985).
193. PHILLIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 97 (1948).
See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART (2013).
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to grant protection to the persons and property of foreigners-indeed, to
those of every human being-can be discerned from the great "Lockean
trinity" of human rights, which is formed by linking property with life and
liberty. In this view, property was not limited to assets having a cash value;
it also included "all that belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished
to preserve."1 94 The answer was also reflected in the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, in which George Mason proclaimed that:
[A]ll men are created equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent natural rights of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or
divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety. 95
In the absence of property, in rem and in personam, "one could not enjoy
life or liberty, and could not be free and independent. Only the property
holder could make independent decisions and choices because he was not
beholden to anyone; he had no need to be subservient."'9 6 Theoretically, this
remains true no matter where human beings live and what their status is.
Neither in their own motherland as citizens, nor in an alien land as foreigners
shall they be without protection of personal and property rights.
2. Protection and Security in International Law
In the realm of international law, there are two conflicting claims
regarding the protection of the persons and property of aliens, both of which
are equally based on state sovereignty, as Lauterpacht pointed out. On the
one hand, national states insist that while their subjects are abroad, their
personal rights and property shall be respected. On the other hand, territorial
states plead that they have full freedom to legislate and administrate so long
as they do not discriminate against foreigners, thus putting them on the same
footing as their own subjects.1 9 7 The following discussion highlighting
works of prominent international law scholars will serve to illustrate these
two claims, which had been discussed for centuries.
According to Grotius, although the sovereign's power of eminent domain
was unlimited over its own subjects, it did not have control over the property
194. Leonard W. Levy, Property As a Human Right, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 169, 175
(1988) (quoting THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAPTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAW 3813 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909)).
195. Id. at 173.
196. Id. at 175.
197. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, Delictual Relations between States. State Responsibility,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT
383, 386 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
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of foreigners. 9 8 For Wolff, foreigners as temporary citizens ought to be safe
from every injury, and the rulers of the states in which they live are bound to
defend them against such injury. Such rulers ought to shield foreigners from
physical and nonphysical harms caused by their subjects; they "ought not to
allow any one of [their] subjects to cause a loss or do a wrong to the citizen
of another nation."' 99 Having failed to do so, they ought to punish those
subjects and require them to repair the harms unless the rulers cause that loss
or do that wrong by their tacit approval of the act, rendering the states
themselves under the assumption of having done the wrong or inflicted the
injury. This duty to provide protection and security was based on a tacit
agreement between foreigners and the rulers of the states, by which the
former promises temporary obedience of the law of the latter, who promises
200protection. Wolff's use of "injury," "loss," and "wrong" suggests quite
strongly that he did not limit states' duty to defend foreigners to physical
protection. Later, Vattel observed that when receiving foreigners, states
engage to protect them as their own subjects and to "afford them perfect
security." 20 ' As to a foreigner's property, Vattel considered it "a part of the
aggregate wealth of his nation. Any power, therefore, which the lord of the
territory might claim over the property of a foreigner would be equally
derogatory to the rights of the individual owner and to those of the nation of
which he is a member." 20 2 In contrast to Bynkershoek, who considered the
confiscation of alien property at the outbreak of war to be legal, Vattel opined
that such property in land had special claims on the protection of the
sovereign and ought not to be seized unless there was debt or money due to
foreigners. But when it comes to the expulsion of alien residents, both
scholars agree that foreigners should be allowed to delay their departure to
203
wrap up their business.
Calvo put forward what was later known as the Calvo Doctrine, according
to which foreigners are entitled to treatment that is not different or better than
that accorded to the citizens of the country in which they live. Thus, the
protection of their persons and property is dependent on that of the citizens.
In cases of personal and proprietary grievance, citizens cannot seek recourse
198. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES (1646), reprinted in 2 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925).
199. WOLFF, supra note 1, at 536.
200. Id. at 537.
201. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 173
(Joseph Chitty ed., 1867) (1758).
202. Id. at 174.
203. BUTLER & MACCOBY, supra note 90, at 196-97.
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to diplomatic protection; neither can foreigners.204 Borchard, in his treatise
on diplomatic protection, observed that states are not "a guarantor of the
safety of aliens." 2 05  Providing administrative and judicial machinery
normally protecting the alien in his rights is simply what states are bound to
do. This remains the case even when there exists a treaty that provides
"special protection"; the treaty is not "an insurance against all injury" but an
instrument that places aliens on the same footing as citizens. States simply
have to protect aliens as much as their actual ability to protect permits.2 06 In
favor of the national treatment standard, Sir John Williams noted that "it
becomes difficult to see why the standard of the duty of a government in
relation to this particular class of individuals [foreigners], and that normally
a small class, should be different from the standard of its duty to its own
citizens." 20 7  Both protection of foreigners' property and protection of
foreigners in other respects do not require a different standard of duty.2 08 For
Eagleton, although a state has control over its own territory, it is not always
incumbent upon it to be responsible for any injury occurring therein. It
cannot be considered "as an absolute guarantor of the proper conduct of all
persons within its bounds." 209 And "[t]he law of nations does not make the
state a guarantor of life and property." 210 In Freeman's view, "[t]he State
into which an alien has entered . .. is not an insurer or a guarantor of his
security, any more than that of its own citizens. It does not, and could hardly
be asked to, accept an absolute liability for all injuries to foreigners." 2 11 In
Hall's treatise on international law, it was once reaffirmed that the concept
of protection of subjects of states that were abroad is not limited to a physical
dimension but extended to "the justice of the courts."212
In protecting aliens, writers have generally agreed that states have been
204. See Patrick Juillard, Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Clause, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 2, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e689 (last updated Jan. 2007) ("The Calvo Doctrine rests upon one core
proposition: aliens should not be entitled to any rights or privileges not accorded to
nationals.").
205. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 179 (1916).
206. Id.
207. Williams, supra note 2, at 15.
208. See id. (noting that the practice with citizens differs from theory).
209. CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77
(1928).
210. Id. at 8.
211. ALWYN V. FREEMAN, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS OF THEIR
ARMED FORCES 14 (A.W. Sijthoff ed., 1957).
212. HALL, supra note 133, at 331-33.
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required to exercise due diligence.2 13 By defining "due diligence" as
"nothing more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a
well-administered government could be expected to exercise under similar
circumstances," it follows naturally that "[t]he precise degree of such
vigilance is not necessarily the same for all situations."2 14 Still, due diligence
has been disputed by international law authorities as to who should really
serve as tertium comparationis (a common comparative denominator) in
such situations; there could be either a subjective or objective denominator.
For the former, "the relatively limited existing possibilities of local
authorities in a given context" is to be considered, while, for the latter, "what
should be legitimately expected to be secured for foreign investors by a
reasonably well organized modem State" takes precedence as the quoted
definition suggests.215 In Brierly's view, it is a reasonable state that serves
as a denominator. The standard it has to obey "is not an exacting one, nor
does it require a uniform degree of governmental efficiency irrespective of
circumstances."216 For Brownlie, it is a state in such situations itself that
serves as a referee: "Where a reasonable care or due diligence standard is
applicable, then diligentia quan in suis might be employed ... [it] would
allow for the variations in wealth and educational standards between the
various states of the world."217
According to Oppenheim's International Law, the very first point in
understanding protection and security of foreigners seems to be marked by
213. FREEMAN, supra note 211, at 15-16; IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART I) 162, 168 (1986) [hereinafter BROWNLIE 1986];
see BROWNLIE, supra note 89, at 455 (indicating the existence of writers' general
agreement that "the rule of non-responsibility cannot apply where the government
concerned has failed to show due diligence").
214. FREEMAN, supra note 211, at 15-16.
215. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,¶77 (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital034
.pdf.
216. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 280 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (1928) (further exemplifying
that "measures of police protection which would be reasonable in a capital city cannot
fairly be demanded in a sparsely populated territory, and a security which is normal in
times of tranquility cannot be expected in a time of temporary disorder such as may
occasionally occur even in a well-ordered state").
217. BROWNLIE, supra note 89, at 526 (footnote omitted); see also Pierre Dupuy, Due
Diligence in the International Law of Liability, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER
POLLUTION 369, 375 (OECD ed., 1977) (noting that "factors may exist . .. which lead to
the relaxation and adaption of the application of the minimum standard of behaviour,
connected not with the circumstances in which the damage occurred, but with the status
of the defendant State itself"); BRIAN SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES OF DECISION 40 (1988) (concluding that "the diligence of the
state will be considered in light of its particular capacities and practices").
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customary international law that leaves the reception of foreigners to states'
discretion, unless there are treaties that provide otherwise. 218 Next, upon
entering a state, foreigners on the one hand fall under the territorial
jurisdiction of the state while remaining under personal jurisdiction of their
national states. Thus, they are responsible to the state for all acts they
commit on its territory.2 19 On the other hand, protection must be afforded to
the persons and property of foreigners by the territorial state. Such a state
has to grant foreigners' persons and property "at least that level of protection
which is sufficient to meet those minimum international standards prescribed
by international law, and must grant [them] at least equality before the law
with its own nationals as far as safety of person and property is
concerned." 22 0
In other words, foreigners must not be wronged in person or property by
the officials or courts of states, arrested by the police without just cause,
arbitrarily treated by administrative officials, or unjustly treated by courts
inconsistent with the law.2 2 ' For their property, the same treatise puts it the
following way:
A state must not, through its officials or courts, injure an alien through
injury to his property, an alien must be allowed access to the courts in
order to protect his property, and have equality before the law in doing so;
a state's duty to protect aliens applied as much to their property as to their
persons; a state's obligation to observe in its treatment of aliens certain
minimum international standards applies also in respect of their property.
The rule is clearly established that a state is bound to respect the property
of aliens, and that for their part aliens have the right to the peaceful use
and enjoyment of their property. 222
However, protection of their property is by no means absolute. As
territorial states and foreign property are politically, socially, and
economically connected and the former can determine their relations with
the latter to produce certain results, property rights of the latter can thus be
diminished or extinguished.223
It is worth turning back to the second conflicting claim referred to earlier,
that territorial states have full freedom to legislate and administrate so long
as they do not discriminate against foreigners as compared with their
nationals. The prevailing counterclaim is that they are not free to wield their
218. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 191, at 897-98.
219. Id. at 904.
220. Id. at 910; see also 3 HACKWORTH, supra note 137, at 630, 660.
221. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 191, at 910-11.
222. Id. at 912.
223. Id.
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legislative and administrative powers to avoid their international obligations.
States cannot plead that their own law and practice do not consider a disputed
act as involving discrimination against foreigners as compared with their
own nationals. In this case, it is the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment that takes precedence over domestic law in determining
whether states incur international responsibility.224
Two relevant questions arise at this point: (1) is the FPS standard
contained in investment treaties of exactly the same content as that of the
customary international law obligation to provide full protection and
security; and (2), how fully does the treaty-based FPS standard protect and
secure investment? The debate on these two questions brings together
international law experts with conflicting views.
For the first question, some scholars, for example, Sacerdoti, opine that
the FPS standard manifested in the form of a standard clause "does not add
to the protection to which foreigners are entitled as to their persons and assets
abroad under international law."225 By contrast, others, for example, Dolzer
and Schreuer, hold that the FPS standard "represents an autonomous treaty
standard that is independent of the international minimum standard under
customary international law."226 Between these two positions is Lorz's
position that the FPS standard is "the bottom line of protection and security,
unless the State parties to the treaty at issue have clearly stated their intent to
stall the development of the treaty standard at this point. "227 For Subedi, the
qualifying phrase-"as required by international law"-that accompanies
the FPS standard plays a role in determining its level of protection. In the
absence of reference to international law, the level of protection and security
would be as high as the provisions in investment treaties indicate, which is
often higher than customary international law.2 28 Accordingly, there are two
conflicting views on the scope of the FPS standard. Conservatively, the FPS
standard has been interpreted as exclusively or principally covering physical
violence as uncontestably required by customary international law. 22 9
224. Id.at931.
225. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment
Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251, 347 (1997); see VANDEVELDE, supra note 149,
at 243.
226. Schreuer, supra note 3, at 364.
227. Lorz, supra note 10, at 773.
228. Surya P. Subedi, The Challenge ofReconciling the Competing Principles Within
the Law of Foreign Investment with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the
Interpretation of the Term "Expropriation," 40 INT'L L. 121, 125-26 (2006).
229. McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 247; SALACUSE, supra note 4, at 239-40;
SCHILL, supra note 10, at 81; SUBEDI, supra note 10, at 67; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 558 (2d ed. 2008).
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Liberally, it has been viewed as extending beyond physical protection to
legal protection.230 In discussing physical protection, there are two different
views as to whether legal remedies for physical harms remain within the
traditional scope of the FPS standard or should be considered as an extension
of the traditional scope. Moss considers "[t]he protection that the legal
systems affords in order to prevent or prosecute actions that threaten or
impair the physical safety of the investment" as "an extension of ... physical
security." 231' Lorz, on the other hand, does not view the provision of legal
remedies as really constituting such an extension "as long as the availability
of the judicial system in particular to remedy and to prosecute stays
connected with a physical impairment of the investment." 23 2 In describing
legal protection, Wdlde included economic regulatory powers in the scope
of the FPS standard, "the omission of the State to intervene where it had the
power and duty to do so to protect the normal ability of the investor's
business to function. "233 But the FPS standard is not intended to protect an
investment from threats that it contributed.234
For the second question regarding liability standards, although there is a
view that the FPS standard imposes strict liability in cases of damage by state
235
organs, most commentators agree that it does not do so. For them, the FPS
standard does not grant investments absolute but rather reasonable protection
and security determined by "due diligence,"236 the very dogmatic definition
of which would be inappropriate, since it is to be determined dependent on
the circumstances.237 Host states thus owe an obligation of conduct or
obligation of means in lieu of an obligation of result. "[O]bligations of due
230. Alejandro M. Garro, Trade and Investment Treaties, the Rule of Law, and
Standards of the Administration of Justice, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 267, 269
(2011); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 205, 359-
60 (3d ed. 2010); Moss, supra note 7, at 131; A. REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 492 (4th ed. 2004); Thomas W. Wilde,
Energy Charter Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration: Controversial Issues, 5 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 373, 390-91 (2004); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 61 (1995); Foster, supra note 105, at 1149-50.
231. Moss, supra note 7, at 131.
232. Lorz, supra note 10, at 782.
233. Wilde, supra note 230, at 390-91.
234. Maximilian Hocke, Have Measures Adopted by States to Cope with the Global
Financial Crisis Been in Accordance with Their Obligations Under International
Investment Law?, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 177, 191 (2012).
235. Lorz, supra note 10, at 778.
236. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 230, at 61; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 17,
at 161; VANDEVELDE, supra note 149, at 243-44; Moss, supra note 7, at 139.
237. BROWNLIE, supra note 89, at 455.
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diligence are relative." 23 8 Once again, as has been the case under customary
international law, there is an open question as to the relevance of host states'
level of development to a determination of the precise level of due diligence.
Some hold that due diligence is objective and not affected by host states'
level of development.239 Others insist that due diligence is subjective and
dependent on host states' development, stability, capacity, and resources. 2 40
B. Local Judicial Perspective
The United States, because of its well-recognized role in developing
customary international law serving as a basis for the FPS standard, is
exemplary of local decisions that are in line with the "Lockean trinity" of
human rights, 24 ' having continued to shed light on the standard through its
treaties, legislations, and judicial judgments. Internationally, the United
States has led in the making of treaties protective of its nationals' persons
and property abroad through FCNs and BITs. 24 2 In its making of FCNs, the
United States made it clear that the intent of the FPS standard was to "commit
the government to that measure of security which its legal, judicial and
protective agencies are capable of ensuring" and that it extended to
"government protection against violence or persecution at private hands." 243
Later, in some of its investment treaties, the United States is more specific
in limiting the standard to police protection.244 Nationally, the previously
238. CRAWFORD,supra note 193, at 227.
239. See Stephen J. Schnably, Comment, The Human Element: The Impact of
Regional Trade Agreements on the Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 42 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (2011); Lawal Oluwaseun Sadiq, Variability ofFair and
Equitable Treatment Standard According to the Level of Development, Governance
Capacity and Resources ofHost Countries, 9 J. INT'L COM. L. & TECH. 229, 234 (2014).
240. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 310 (2009); Eric De Brabandere, Host States' Due Diligence Obligations in
International Investment Law, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 319, 357, 361 (2015);
Ursula Kriebaum, The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection
Under Investment Treaties, 10 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS. 383, 384 (2011);
Nick Gallus, The Influence of the Host State's Level of Development on International
Investment Treaty Standards ofProtection, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 711, 714 (2005);
Lorz, supra note 10, at 779-80; Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, The Guarantee of "Full
Protection and Security" in Investment Treaties Regarding Harm Caused by Private
Actors, 2005:3 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 1, 21-23 (2005).
241. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 230, at 359; see also Foster, supra note 105, at
1142.
242. See Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 203; Subedi, supra note 228, at 125.
243. John F. Coyle & Jason Webb Yackee, Reviving the Treaty of Friendship:
Enforcing International Investment Law in U.S. Courts, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 94 (2017)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting CHARLES H. SULLIVAN, DOS, STANDARD DRAFT TREATY
OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION 84 (1981)).
244. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral
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noted Virginia Declaration of Rights' proclamation was proposed and
accepted as the first article of the U.S. Bill of Rights. Property rights have
been explicitly protected by the United States Constitution by its Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as by the contract
clause of Article I, section 10. In particular, the taking of private property
for public use "without just compensation" is prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment.24 5
Judicially, the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to address
FPS-related issues that remain particularly relevant to a contemporary
understanding of the standard. First, in Barbier v. Connolly,246 the Court
confirmed that all persons should have equal protection and security for their
persons and property regardless of whether they are citizens or aliens:
The fourteenth amendment, in declaring that no State "shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary
deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that
equal protection and security should be given to all under like
circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all
persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire
and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the
country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention
and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no
impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as
applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the
same calling and condition, and that in the administration of criminal
justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than
such as is prescribed to all for like offences. 247
The above statement was approvingly quoted and applied to aliens in Yick
Wo v. HopkinS248 to invalidate the conviction of an alien for violation of an
ordinance that was administered discriminately against persons of Chinese
descent.249 In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,25 0 the Court explained the
link between property and rights as follows:
Investment Treaty art. 5, U.S. TRADE REP. (2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
245. FRANCK, supra note 187, at 453.
246. 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
247. Id at 31 (emphasis added).
248. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
249. Id at 367-68.
250. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right of
speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right.... In fact, a
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right to property. Neither could have meaning without
the other.251
Of immediate relevance to an understanding of the FPS standard is
Maiorano v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. 252 In this case, the Court shed
light on the scope ratione tertiis, ratione personae, and ratione materiae of
the FPS clause in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the
United States of America and His Majesty the King of Italy of 1871.253 The
plaintiff was an Italian resident and subject of the King of Italy who brought
action in a Pennsylvania court to recover damages for the death of her
husband caused by the defendant's negligence.2 54 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held, prior to this case, that the applicable law of Pennsylvania
gave the right of action to the deceased's relatives, except those who were
non-resident aliens.255 The U.S. Supreme Court found no reason to depart
from that holding.256 Thus, she was denied the right of action due to her non-
resident-alien status. Nonetheless, the plaintiff based her right to recover
not only on that applicable law but also on the aforementioned treaty. 25 7 In
particular, emphasis was placed on its Article 3, which accorded the citizens
of each party in the territory of the other "the most constant protection and
security of person and property. "258 Since the plaintiff and her property had
never been within the territory of the United States, she herself was found
outside the ratione tertiis reach of the clause, being incompetent to claim
protection and security for her person or property.25 9
Still, there was another argument that "if the right of action for her
husband's death is denied to her, that he, the husband, has not enjoyed the
equality of protection and security for his person which this article of the
treaty assures to him." 26 0 Although the Court accepted that the argument was
251. Id. at 552.
252. 213 U.S. 268 (1909).
253. Id. at 272.
254. Id. at 271.
255. Id. (noting that the Pennsylvania statute at-issue "does not give to relatives of the
deceased, who are nonresident aliens, the right of action therein provided for").
256. Id. at 275.
257. Id. at 271-72.
258. Id. at 273.
259. Id. at 271-74.
260. Id. at 274.
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not completely without weight, it was of the opinion "that the protection and
security thus afforded are so indirect and remote that the contracting powers
can not [sic] fairly be thought to have had them in contemplation." 2 6' The
Court accordingly found that the scope ratione personae of the FPS clause
under consideration was limited to an Italian subject residing in the United
States and not extended to his non-resident relatives. 26 2 Regarding the scope
ratione materiae of the clause, the Court did not limit it to physical harms,
construing it as including rights of actions that did not necessarily stem from
physical harms. In the Court's own words:
If an Italian subject, sojourning in this country, is himself given all the
direct protection and security afforded by the laws to our own people,
including all rights of actions for himself or his personal representatives
to safeguard the protection, and security, the treaty is fully complied with,
without going further and giving to his non-resident alien relatives a right
of action for damages for his death, although such action is afforded to
native resident relatives, and although the existence of such an action may
indirectly promote his safety. 263
Barbier, Yick Wo, and Maiorano can thus be read to confirm that from the
United States's perspective, the FPS standard had not been limited to
physical violence. Legal protection and entitlement relating to the protection
and security for persons or property thus fall within the scope thereof as
much as the language used in the treaty permits. This has been confirmed in
other judgments issued by the Court and other courts. For example, in
Asakura v. City ofSeattle,264 the Court found that an ordinance prohibiting a
Japanese subject from getting a license to engage in the business of
pawnbroking, as included in the treaty meaning of "trade," violated the FPS
clause in the treaty between the United States and Japan of 1911. 265 The
Court found that such an ordinance was inconsistent with the parties'
intention to accord the citizens or subjects of either side liberty in the territory
261. Id. at 274-75.
262. Id. at 275 (explaining that the treaty affords Italian subjects a right of action, not
non-resident relatives).
263. Id. (emphasis added).
264. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
265. Id at 343.
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of the other to engage in "trade."266 Additionally, in In re Estate of Yano, 267
the Supreme Court of California confirmed that the FPS standard was only
available to alien subjects in a matter that directly related to their persons and
property. 2 68 In this case, a Japanese subject was denied the right to be
appointed as a guardian of his minor daughter who was a United States
citizen by reasons of domestic laws. It was contended that such denial was
in violation of the FPS clause in the same treaty discussed in Asakura.26 9
However, the Supreme Court of California found otherwise, rendering such
a right unnecessary for the security or protection for persons or property:
The rights and privileges which [the treaty] declares the Japanese
citizen shall enjoy here are such rights and privileges only as may be
necessary for the protection and security of his own person or property. It
cannot be said that it is necessary for the security or protection of either
the person or the property of a parent that he should become the guardian
of his own child. Eligibility to appointment as guardian is not property,
nor is it a right of property. It pertains exclusively to the person. It may
be given or withheld by the law of the state in which the parent and child
reside. The withholding thereof from all parents would be within the
power of the state. Undoubtedly, when given, it is a privilege pertaining
to the individual parent, but it is not a privilege which enhances his own
personal security or which assists him in protecting his property. A
deprivation of the privilege would in no manner endanger the person of
the parent, or jeopardize his property. 270
Both in Patsone v. Pennsylvania27' and Heim v. McCall,272 the U.S.
Supreme Court made it clear that the equality of rights assured by the FPS
clause was not without limit. It emphasized "that the equality of rights that
it [the treaty] assures is equality only in respect of protection and security for
persons and property. "273 Equality of rights in all respects is not the case.
266. See id. at 342-43; see also Ohio v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1927)
(holding that the city of Cincinnati's ordinance that prohibited the issuance of pool room
licenses to aliens did not violate Article I of the treaty of commerce of 1815 between the
United States and Great Britain, which provided that the nationals of each in the territory
of the other shall "enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce."
This is because the proprietor of the pool room did not "engage in commerce within the
meaning of a treaty which merely extends to 'merchants and traders' 'protection and
security for their commerce"').
267. 206 P. 995 (Cal. 1922).
268. See generally id. at 997-1003.
269. Id. at 999.
270. Id. at 999-1000.
271. 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
272. 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
273. Patsone, 232 U.S. at 145 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the law that illegalized the killing of wild game by
unnaturalized foreign-born residents and their possession of shotguns and
rifles for that killing, as discussed in the former case, did not violate the FPS
standard.2 74 Nor did the law that prohibit the employment of aliens upon
public works and required that preference be given to citizens of a particular
state over others as deliberated in the latter case. 2 75
C. International Judicial Perspective
In interpreting and applying the FPS standard in investment treaties,
decisions of other judicial bodies discussing certain fundamentals for
treating aliens and state responsibility can serve as a guideline for investment
tribunals. Made either in the general international context or in the specific
contexts of protectorate and of friendship, commerce, and navigation, they
can be informative of how past participants had addressed protection of
foreigners and construed some issues that have turned to be critical for
determining host states' compliance with the FPS standard nowadays in the
context of international investment.
The first context gave rise to "the historical starting point" 276 for a
discussion on the international standard of treatment for foreigners. It is in
Neer v. Mexico,277 wherein such a point was made and has later been
regarded as declarative of the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens. Presented with the murder of a U.S. national
in Mexico, the General Claims Commission had to decide if the Mexican
authorities lacked diligence in apprehending or punishing those guilty of
murder as alleged by the United States. In its finding that a lack of diligence
on the part of the Mexican authorities was not established and that the claim
was disallowed, the Commission stated that "the treatment of an alien to
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad
faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of government action
so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial
man would readily recognize its insufficiency." 2 78
Although Neer did not concern foreign investment, it illustrates the
traditional threshold of the international standard of treatment of foreigners.
Having been criticized for its height, the Neer threshold still does not impose
strict liability on states.
For the second context, Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (Great Britain
274. Id. at 145-46.
275. 239 U.S. at 194.
276. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 17, at 139.
277. 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1926).
278. Id. at 61-62.
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v. Spain)2 7 9 is worth mentioning. In adjudicating claims for damage to
British subjects or protected persons' life or property against the Spanish
authorities in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, Arbitrator Max Huber laid down
some principles relating to state responsibility. Of particular relevance here
are the following: (1) although states are not responsible for the occurrence
of a war or revolt, they can be found responsible for their authorities' acts or
omissions to stop it as far as possible, by using appropriate diligence in
giving help or adopting preventive or protective measures; (2) regarding acts
of plunder not tantamount to a state of rebellion, states are responsible if they
fail by an appreciable margin to exercise diligentia quam in suis (one is
required to exercise a level of care that he exercises in his own affairs); and
(3) states can be responsible for their failure to prosecute wrongdoers causing
harms to aliens or to apply proper civil sanctions. 28 0 From this decision,
current participants have learned-and made use of the opinion-that
diligence applies and is to be determined by various factors.
In the third context, the Sambiaggio Case (Italy v. Venezuela), 281' decided
by the Italy-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission, also offers an insight on
the standard of liability. In determining whether Venezuela was responsible
to Mr. Salvatore Sambiaggio, an Italian citizen, for damage caused by
revolutionists' acts in its territory, Umpire Jackson H. Ralston had to
consider Article 4 of the Italy-Venezuela Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation of 1861, which promised each party's citizens and subjects
"the fullest measure of protection and security of person and property." 28 2
The umpire "accepts the rule that if in any case of reclamation submitted to
him it is alleged and proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise
due diligence to prevent damage from being inflicted by revolutionists, that
country should be held responsible."283 Since no lack of due diligence had
been alleged or proved, the claim was dismissed.284
Besides Sambiaggio, there are other cases that dealt with the FPS standard
in the context of FCN treaties before other judicial fora, for example, the
International Court of Justice and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
Thus, let us turn now to their treatment of the standard.
1. The International Court ofJustice
Searching through the dockets of the Permanent Court of International
279. 2 R.I.A.A. 615 (1924).
280. Id. at 615.
281. 10 R.I.A.A. 499 (Mixed Claims Comm'n 1903).
282. Id. at 518.
283. Id. at 524.
284. Id. at 512, 524.
2018 43
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA WREVIEW
Justice ("PCIJ") and the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") shows that the
FPS standard was rarely raised before the world's most senior international
court. There appear to be only two cases in which the ICJ addressed "the
most constant protection and security": United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran and Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI). Other
judgments or opinions just referred to the standard in passing.2 85
The Islamic Revolution in late 1978 and early 1979 entailed a number of
legal disputes among various international law participants of different
levels. At the interstate level, one of those disputes concerning the climax
of the revolution, Iranian demonstrators' invasion of the U.S. Embassy
compound,286 was brought before the ICJ in United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran.2 87 Therein, the United States claimed that in
respect of the two private U.S. individuals said to be held hostage during the
seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and its Consulates in Tabriz and
Shiraz by the invading demonstrators ("Muslim Student Followers of the
Imam's Policy"), Iran violated Article 11(4) of the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955.288 According to the
article, it was a duty of the parties to the treaty to provide "the most constant
protection and security" to each party's nationals in the territory of the
other.28 9 The Court found that in the presence of the Iranian government's
inaction, the seizure of those individuals as hostages by the invading
demonstrators incidentally entailed a breach of Iran's obligations both under
the aforesaid article and general international law.2 90 This was consistent
with the purpose of treaties of this kind, that is, "to promote friendly relations
between the two countries concerned, and between their two peoples, more
especially by mutual undertakings to ensure the protection and security of
their nationals in each other's territory. "291
In Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. ("ELSI") lies the most frequently cited, and
probably most authoritative,292 ICJ pronouncement on the FPS standard. The
United States argued that Italy violated its obligations under Article V of the
285. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) I.C.J. 1996, Preliminary Objection, Judgment,
I.C.J. Rep. 803 (Dec. 12); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) I.C.J. Preliminary Objection,
Judgment, 1996.) I.C.J. Rep. 874, 876 (Dec. 12) (dissenting opinion of Vice President
Schwebel).
286. Charles N. Brower, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 224 RECUEIL DES
COURS 135, 271-72 (1998).
287. Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24).
288. Id. at 6, 13.
289. Id. at 32.
290. Id. at 13-14, 17, 27-28, 32.
291. Id. at 28.
292. SALACUSE, supra note 4, at 232.
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Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Italy and United
States of 1948, which required the granting of the full protection and security
required by international law and supplemented by the national treatment
and the most-favored-nation treatment. According to paragraph 1 thereof,
the nationals of one party in the territory of the other party shall receive "the
most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and
shall enjoy in this respect the full protection required by international law."293
And as continued in paragraph 3, such protection and security shall not be
less than that granted to the nationals, corporations, and associations of the
other party or of any third country. The United States claimed that by
allowing workers at ELSI, an Italian company wholly owned by two U.S.
corporations, to occupy the plant belonging to ELSI, Italy breached its
obligations.294
A Chamber of the Court found that the reference to "constant protection
and security" was not of absolute force, rendering it incapable of being
construed as "the giving of a warranty that property shall never in any
circumstances be occupied or disturbed."2 9 5 This statement is consistent with
the court's prior conclusion in Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania)2 96 that under
customary international law, a state that exercised control over its territory
does not bear prima facie responsibility. 29 7  Having considered the
reasonable foreseeability of the protest and the occupation by those
dismissed workers, a failure to establish that any deterioration in the plant
and machinery was caused by the workers' presence, and the Italian
authorities' ability to protect the plant and in some measure to continue
production, the Chamber thus ruled that the protection so provided could be
regarded as falling below neither the full protection and security required by
international law nor the national and most-favored-nation treatments. In
addition, the unlawfulness of the occupation pronounced by the competent
domestic court per se did not necessarily suggest that the national treatment
had been violated. Instead, it was the local law in book and in practice that
did. In the absence of the establishment that such law had treated U.S.
nationals less well than Italian nationals, the Chamber thus found no
violation of both paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article V. 2 98
293. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, art. V, It.-U.S., Feb. 2, 1948,
63 Stat. 2255.
294. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 63, 65, ¶¶
102-07 (July 20).
295. Id. at 65.
296. Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9).
297. Id. at 18.
298. Elettronica Sicula, 1989 I.C.J. ¶ 108.
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Notably, in addition to the physical occupation of the plant, the United
States further referred to a sixteen-month period before the Prefect decided
ELSI's administrative appeal against the requisition order as violating the
FPS obligation.29 9 Having considered the circumstances concerned, the
Chamber found that "[i]t must be doubted whether in all the circumstances,
the delay in the Prefect's ruling in this case can be regarded as falling below
that standard."300 It noted that the FPS standard in the present case that was
supplemented by reference to international law "may go further" than what
general international law requires.3 0 ' Reference to international law does not
limit the FPS standard to the minimum standard of treatment. It serves as a
threshold below which the FPS cannot fall.
2. The Iran- United States Claims Tribunal
In addition to giving rise to United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran, the Islamic Revolution led to the establishment of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal ("IUSCT") in 1981. As an arbitral body, its purpose
was to settle disputes that arose during the revolution between United States
nationals and Iran, Iranian nationals and the United States, and the two
governments, as the United States waived any right to submit its disputes
concerning the hostages to the ICJ or other fora.302 One of the issues
submitted was related to the interpretation of the FPS standard in their treaty.
In Rankin v. Iran,3 0 3 a Chamber of the IUSCT suggested that both violence
and harassment of various types against foreigners and their property
resulting from the anti-American statements could violate the FPS standard.
It also confirmed that protection and security has been part of customary
international law. Put in the Chamber's own words:
The statements ... of the leaders of the Revolution could, however,
have reasonably been expected to initiate or prompt the types of
harassment and violence that were suffered by individual U.S. nationals
and other foreigners. . . . These statements, which clearly are attributable
to the Revolutionary Movement and thereby to the Iranian State... , were
inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty of Amity and customary
international law to accord protection and security to foreigners and their
property. 304
Claiming for compensation for lost property and property rights (lost
299. Id.
300. Id. ¶ I 11.
301. Id.
302. See Brower, supra note 286, at 135.
303. Case No. 10913, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 135 (1987).
304. Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added).
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salary and other employment-related benefits) arising from alleged wrongful
expulsion from Iran, the claimant could not release its burden of proof It
failed to show that its departure was caused by the alleged wrongful acts of
Iran. Accordingly, the claim was dismissed.3 05 In Starrett Housing Corp. v.
Iran,3 0 6 a Chamber held that "interests in property" was "sufficiently broad
to include indirect ownership of property rights held through a subsidiary
that is not a United States national."3 07
Additionally, there are dissenting opinions in which FPS-related issues
were addressed. In Lillian Byrdine Grimm v. Iran,30 8 Judge Holtzmann
opined that a widow's right to financial support from her husband who was
assassinated in Iran constituted property that Iran was obliged to accord the
most constant protection and security.30 9 In Ina Corp. v. Iran,310 Judge Ameli
considered the United States blockage of property and interests in property
of Iran, the prohibition on exports to and imports from Iran, and the armed
invasion of Iran as the Unites States' failure to comply with its most constant
protection and security obligation.3 1 '
IV. THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TRIBUNALS
Our task in this Section is to continue our trend analysis. To project
arbitral trends in dealing with the FPS standard, we will examine the degree
to which an interpretation and application of the FPS standard has been
achieved in investment awards. Although the 1990s witnessed the first two
international investment law cases addressing the FPS standard, the decades
that followed saw an increase in the number of cases touching upon the same
standard. Those cases, from 1990 to early 2017, serve as our first platform
from which to consider how tribunals have construed the FPS standard. We
find that arbitral tribunals have interpreted the FPS standard in diverse ways.
Their divergent interpretations serve as our basis for systematically
categorizing them. Thus, in this part, all salient aspects of arbitral treatment
of the FPS standard will be presented analytically. Also, a factor analysis
will now be conducted, along with our ongoing trend analysis, to correlate
past decisions with conditions that influenced them and consider whether the
context of such conditions has changed in a meaningful way.
305. Id. ¶ 38-39.
306. Case No. 24, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (1987).
307. Id. 262.
308. Case No. 71, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 78 (1983).
309. Id. at 81, 86 (Holtzmann, J., dissenting).
310. Case No. 161, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985).
311. Id. at 438-39 (Ameli, J., dissenting).
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Our review of arbitral awards reveals that the extant body of international
investment law jurisprudence on the treaty-based FPS standard sheds light
on its relation to customary international law, its nature of protection and
security, the materiality of terminological variations, its scope ratione
materiae, its scope ratione personae, and its relation to other standards and
principles, that is, the FET standard, the principles of effectiveness and
procedural economy, the MFN treatment, protection against unreasonable or
discriminatory measures, expropriation, and full protection crafted in general
terms at the beginning of BITs.
A. Treaty-Based FPS Standard and Customary International Law
A careful reading of the awards reveals contradictions between tribunals'
views on the relation between the treaty-based FPS standard and a customary
international law duty to provide full protection and security. There are
skeptics, opponents, and advocates of the independence of the FPS clause
from customary international law.
For skeptics, it seems unclear whether the FPS standard as manifested in
the form of an FPS clause in investment treaties can be understood as having
a wider scope than the general duty of due diligence to provide foreign
nationals with full protection and security found in customary international
law.3 12
For opponents, the FPS standard is not an autonomous treaty norm that
imposes more requirements than does the minimum standard. It is "no more
than the traditional obligation to protect aliens under international customary
law."313 This has also been confirmed indirectly: by first finding that the
FET standard is indistinguishable from the customary international
minimum standard and then ruling that a violation of the FET standard is
enough to prove a breach of the FPS standard,3 14 the customary international
law minimum standard and the FPS are considered alike.315 The opponents'
opinion has been passed even in the absence of any specific reference to
general or customary international law in the FPS clause.
Afortiori, the dependence of the FPS standard has been established when
the FPS clause was formulated in a way that explicitly reduced it to part of
312. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 164-66
(Oct. 12, 2005) 16 ICSID 210 (2012).
313. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 522
(Oct. 31, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf.
314. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶¶ 520,
548 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
7507.pdf
315. Id. ¶¶ 514-26.
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the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens,
the explanatory note of which clarifies that the minimum standard neither
requires treatment additional to or beyond treatment required by customary
international law nor creates additional substantive rights.316 Thus, a
threshold for its breach is relatively high.317 In this case, the minimum
standard of treatment, the element of which includes the FPS standard,
"cannot be interpreted in the expansive fashion in which some autonomous
fair and equitable treatment or full protection and security provisions of other
treaties have been interpreted."318 To prove a breach of the minimum
standard of treatment, the claimant is required to show that the respondent
"has acted with a gross or flagrant disregard for the basic principles of
fairness, consistency, even-handedness, due process, or natural justice
expected by and of all States under customary international law."31 9 Since
the bar for a breach of the minimum standard of treatment is relatively high,
the bar of the FPS standard is elevated to the same level.320 Opponents hold
that as textually part of the minimum standard of treatment, the FPS standard
cannot be interpreted as expansively as can an autonomous FPS clause. Its
scope and content are determined by customary international law, the
threshold of which was originally high, as set forth in Neer.32 '
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the FPS standard has been completely
frozen in time. Some tribunals, openly accepting that customary
international law evolves and is shaped by the conclusion of investment
treaties, have adopted an evolutionary interpretation of the FPS standard.322
316. See Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd., v. U.S., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 174,
176, 214 (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 56820.pdf
317. Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/33, Award, ¶¶ 181, 380, 382, 383,
386 (Nov. 3, 2015), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/
C1960/DC6932_En.pdf; Bilcon of Del. v. Can., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04,
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 360, 392, 431, 432, 441 (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287.
318. Al Tamimi, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/33, ¶ 382; see also ADF Grp. Inc. v. United
States, ICSID CaseNo. ARB(AF)/00/01, Award, 183 (Jan. 9,2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 449
(2004) ("We are not convinced that the Investor has shown the existence, in current
customary international law, of a general and autonomous requirement (autonomous, that
is, from specific rules addressing particular, limited, contexts) to accord fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security to foreign investments.").
319. Al Tamimi, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, ¶ 390.
320. Id. 11 394, 448-50.
321. Neer v. Mex. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1926).
322. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 116, 125
(Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID 181 (2004); see also Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mex.,
UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 194 (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/
attachment/file/29506/260106_LaudoING.pdf (holding that "[t]he content of the
minimum standard should not be rigidly interpreted and it should reflect evolving
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"[I]t is unconvincing to confine the meaning of. . . 'full protection and
security' of foreign investments to what those terms - had they been current
at the time - might have meant in the 1920s when applied to the physical
security of an alien."323 As a result, its threshold may not be as high as it was
set by the Neer Commission.32 4  Even in cases where specific textual
interpretation leads to the conclusion that the FPS standard is a higher
standard than the minimum standard of treatment and that the latter serves
as a floor rather than a ceiling for the former, both standards could still be
found to have substantially similar contents due to their evolution.32 5
Finally, for advocates, the FPS standard is considered a distinct and
autonomous treaty standard, regardless of whether it has been qualified by
reference to principles of international law. Its content is not the same as
that of the minimum standard of treatment.3 2 6 If the FPS standard is qualified
by reference to international law, such reference is "to set a floor, not a
ceiling."3 2 7 Thus, the FPS standard can be interpreted textually as a higher
standard than required by international law.328 If it is not qualified by
reference to international law, such non-reference serves as support for not
equating the FPS standard with customary international law.3 29
Even when the FPS standard has textually been formulated as included in
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment, as is the
case with NAFTA, one of its possible interpretations is that it goes beyond
customary international law. This "additive interpretation," put forward
before the issuance of the FTC's Notes of Interpretation, treats both the FPS
and FET standards ("the fairness elements")33 0 as "additive" to the
requirements of international law. Therefore, investors can claim the
international customary law").
323. See Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, ¶ 116; see also Chemtura Corp. v.
Can., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 121 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp -diff/chemtura- 14.pdf
324. Al Tamimi, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶ 390.
325. Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 361 (July 14,2006),
14 ICSID 367 (2009).
326. Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/ 11/2, Award, ¶ 632
(Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7194.
pdf.
327. Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 361.
328. Id.
329. Frontier Petroleum Serv. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 268 (Nov.
12, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf
330. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Award on the Merits
of Phase 2, ¶ 109 n.95 (Apr. 10, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0678.pdf.
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international law minimum standard and the fairness elements 331:
Investors are entitled to those elements, no matter what else their
entitlement under international law. A logical corollary to this language
is that compliance with the fairness elements must be ascertained free of
any threshold that might be applicable to the evaluation of measures under
the minimum standard of international law .... Accordingly, the Tribunal
interprets Article 1105 to require that covered investors and investments
receive the benefits of the fairness elements under ordinary standards
applied in the NAFTA countries, without any threshold limitation that the
conduct complained of be "egregious," "outrageous" or "shocking," or
otherwise extraordinary.332
In short, advocates have interpreted the FPS clause as distinct from and
more protective of investment than the minimum standard of treatment,
especially but not necessarily because of its qualifying term "constant" or
"full."333
B. Nature ofProtection and Security
Since its debut in investment arbitration in 1990, the FPS standard has
been given various interpretations, except for the nature or standard of
protection and security it provides. Its relativity has been confirmed by all
arbitral awards under consideration here. According to these awards, the
FPS standard does not impose on the host state strict liability,3 34  the
331. Id.¶110.
332. Id. ¶¶ 111, 118 (footnotes omitted).
333. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award, ¶ 50 (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ital034.pdf. But see Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/1 1/2, Award, ¶ 632 (Apr. 4,2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw7194.pdf
334. Asian Agric. Prods., No. ARB/87/3, ¶ 50; Tulip Real Estate Inv. and Dev. Neth.
B.V. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, ¶¶ 430-37 (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3126.pdf; Allard v.
Barb., PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, ¶¶ 240-250 (June 27, 2016), https://
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1955; T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v.
Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 Award, ¶ 177 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev.-
FILJ 158 (2004); Von Pezold v. Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, ¶¶ 582-96
(July 28, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw795
0.pdf; MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award, ¶ 351 (May
4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7311_0.pdf;
Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1 1, Decision on Liability and
Heads of Loss, ¶¶ 241, 245 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf; Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe
S.A. v. Alb., ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/24, Award, ¶ 821 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4228.pdf; Gemplus S.A. et al. v.
Mex., Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB (AF)/04/3 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award,
¶¶ 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12 (June 16, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
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imposition of which is not allowed in the absence of a specific treaty
provision.33 5  Rather, in protecting investment as long as it remains in
place,336 the FPS standard requires the host state to fulfill its obligation to
exercise due diligence,33 7 which has also been referred to as "a best efforts
obligation,"3 38 prudence,339 vigilance (and care) ,340 or reasonableness 3 4 1
documents/ita0357_0.pdf; AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 13.3.2 (Sept. 23, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0014_0.pdf; Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case
No. 2012-2, Award, ¶ 6.81 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAtt
ach/1957.
335. Lauder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 308 (Sept. 3, 2001), https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita45 1.pdf
336. Eureko B.V. v. Slovk., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 260 (Oct. 26, 2010), https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO3O9.pdf
337. Asian Agric. Prods., ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, ¶ 50; Saluka Invest. B.V. v.
Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 483-84 (Mar. 17, 2006); Rumeli Telekom A.S. v.
Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶¶ 668-70 (July 29, 2008), https://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf; Siag v. Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶¶ 445-48 (June 1, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 164-66 (Oct. 12, 2005); El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Arg.,
Award, ¶ 522 (Oct. 31, 2011); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v.
Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 173, 179 (July 30, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita826.pdf; Plama Consort-
ium Ltd. v. Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶¶ 179-80 (Aug. 27, 2008);
Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶ 223 (Jan.
16, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C45/DC2
872_En.pdf
338. Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, ¶ 537 (Oct.
31, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl272.pdf.
339. 01 European Grp. B.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/25, Award, ¶ 577
(Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7100.
pdf.
340. See Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶¶
6.05-6.06 (Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0028.pdf (viewing the FPS standard as requiring the host state to fulfill its obligation
of vigilance but paradoxically finding that the obligation was breached by the mere
existence of damage, which implied strict liability); Paushok v. Mong., UNCITRAL,
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 323 (Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0622.pdf; El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 522 (Oct. 31, 2011); Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL,
Final Award, ¶ 272 (June 12, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc
uments/ital019.pdf
341. Allard v. Barb., PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, ¶¶ 240-50 (June 27, 2016),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1955.
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against injuries and harassment342 in response to the circumstance.3 43 In Toto
Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Lebanon,3 44 the Tribunal described the
standard as requiring that states shall not act negligently in the prevailing
circumstance.3 45 Pursuant to this obligation, host states must undertake "all
possible measures that could be reasonably expected" to protect and secure
investment3 46 or "take all measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of
protection and security of . . . investment."3 47  Such measures can be
precautionary,348 preventive,34 9 remedial,350 coercive (against those
disrupting investment),3 5' and/or responsive3 52 in nature. What the FPS
standard requires is host states' active conduct, which is more than "the mere
abstention from prejudicial conduct."3 53 All in all, this does not mean that
host states must adopt every specific measure proposed by investors. Neither
342. Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v. Alb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/1 1/24, Award, ¶ 821 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw4228.pdf; AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 13.3.2. (Sept. 23, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/def
ault/files/case-documents/ita0014_0.pdf
343. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,¶73 (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1034
.pdf.
344. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, ¶ 229 (June 7, 2012), http://icsidfiles.world
bank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C104/DC2552_En.pdf
345. Id.
346. See Asian Agric. Prods., ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, ¶ 85(b); Saluka Invest. B.V.
v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 484 (Mar. 17, 2006) (holding that the host state
was under an obligation to "adopt all reasonable measures to protect assets and property
from threats or attacks"); Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, 11
449, 451 (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
law4450.pdf; T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award,¶ 177 (May 29,2003), 19 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 158 (2004); AESSummit
Generation Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 13.3.2.
347. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.05.
(Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaOO28.pdf.
348. Id. at ¶¶ 6.07-6.11; 01 European Grp. B.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB
/11/25, Award, ¶ 580 (Mar. 10, 2015), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLO
BS/OnlineAwards/C 1 800/DC7992_En.pdf
349. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 85-95 (Dec.
8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002).
350. Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award,¶ 229 (June 7, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital
013.pdf.
351. OIEuropean Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, ¶ 580.
352. Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on
Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 245 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf
353. Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award, ¶ 6.81 (Mar.
15, 2016), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1957.
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is their FPS obligation tightened by the fact that they have been parties to
other treaties related to the investment at issue but in a different angle, such
as environmental treaties.354
In detailed arbitral awards, an obligation of due diligence has been
bifurcated as having "a duty of prevention" and "a duty of repression" as its
element. Host states are required to use due diligence to, first, prevent the
persons or property of aliens from being wrongfully injured within their
territory, and second, to punish such injuries if they have failed to prevent
them. Failing to perform either duty gives rise to issues of state
responsibility and compensation. However, this due diligence obligation
does not require host states to prevent all and every risk or injury.3 5 5 instead,
it requires them to take reasonable acts within their power to prevent the
injury, restore the previous situation, and/or punish the author of the injury
when states are, or should be, aware of a risk of injury, depending on the
prevailing circumstances on a case-by-case basis.3 56 Thus, an arbitral answer
to the question of how fully investment is protected and secured is that
investment is not under absolute protection and security, but rather under "a
certain level of protection."3 5 7 This is the point of commonality among many
FPS-related issues that investment tribunals have addressed.35 8
However, in their commonality lies the dichotomy between objectivity
and subjectivity. Initially, a debate on due diligence did not receive much
attention. The Tribunal in AAPL v. Sri Lanka359 shed light on it by adopting
354. Allard v. Barb., PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, 11 240-50 (June 27, 2016),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1955.
355. Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v. Alb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/1 1/24, Award, ¶ 821 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw4228.pdf; Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶ 223 (Jan. 16, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICS
IDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C45/DC2872_En.pdf
356. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 523
(Oct. 31, 2011); Oxus Gold v. Uzb., UNCITRAL, Final Award, 11 353-55 (Dec. 17,
2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0622.pdf));
Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 272 (June 12, 2012); Sergei
Paushok CJS v. Mong., UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 324-25
(Apr. 28, 2011); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,¶ 355 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwa
rds/C252/DC682_En.pdf.
357. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 11 668-70
(July 29, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf.
358. See Alexandrov, supra note 7, at 323 (explaining different FPS-related issues,
such as whether the FPS standard is extended to legal security and concluding that the
standard demands states to act with due diligence).
359. ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 77 (June 27, 1990), 4 ICSID Rep.
246 (1997).
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Freeman's definition, noted previously, that due diligence is "nothing more
nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a well-
administered government could be expected to exercise under similar
circumstances."360 Therefrom, a well-administered government objectively
serves as tertium comparationis (a common comparative denominator) to
indicate the reasonable measures expected to be adopted under similar
circumstances. Later, the Tribunal in American Manufacturing & Trading,
Inc. v. Zaire3 6 ' added that this objective obligation must not be inferior to the
international law minimum standard of treatment.3 62 In practice, awards
dealing with a violation of the FPS standard have not been made in the
abstract without mentioning the prevailing circumstance of the case.3 63 Still,
in so doing, tribunals seem to pay lip service to due diligence. They have
not discussed much about due diligence per se.
It is in few cases that the objectivity of due diligence has been discussed.
The tribunal in Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. Albania3 64
viewed an objective minimum standard of due diligence as "a modified
objective standard" of due diligence, bringing it closer to a subjective
standard of due diligence.3 65  According to this tribunal, in according
investment physical protection, due diligence of different host states can be
different.3 6 6 What matters is due diligence of the host state at issue. Its level
of development and resources is considered to see how due is due enough in
exercising due diligence; investors cannot have the same expectation of
protection from different host states whose local situation and governance
are dissimilar.367 While a proportionality factor has not been generally
accepted in addressing claims of denial of justice, the tribunal believed that
it should be accepted in deciding whether the host state fulfills its duty of
360. See id.; see also Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 625 (Dec.
15, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf;
AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 13.3.3
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/Cl 14/DC1730_En.pdf.
361. ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.06. (Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0028.pdf
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award,
11 349-56 (May 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7311 0.pdf.
364. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng'rs v. Alb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21,
Award, ¶¶ 76 (July 30, 2009), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/On
lineAwards/Ci13/DC1133_En.pdf
365. Id.¶81.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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physical protection and security. In other words, the host state's
international responsibility in this regard should be proportional to its
resources.369  Given the claimant's awareness of "an environment of
desolation and lawlessness," the scale of the disorder, and the police's
inability-not refusal-to protect the claimant's investment, the tribunal
concluded that the respondent had no power under the circumstances and did
not breach the FPS standard.370
On the contrary, a modified objective standard of due diligence, along with
the proportionality test, has recently been denied both in BIT and NAFTA
contexts. In the former context, the tribunal in Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe37 1
rejected the host state's argument that its police were overwhelmed as the
invasions occurred spontaneously and across the country or that its
intervention would have demanded disproportional force given its
constraints and would have resulted in many deaths. 372 In the latter setting,
the tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States, 373 by its finding that the
minimum standard of treatment as a whole did not vary from state to state,
implied that the FPS standard as part of the minimum standard of treatment
was of the same nature. Otherwise, the protection granted would have no
minimum. This denial of a modified objective standard was elaborated in
the following terms:
The customary international law minimum standard of treatment
(including the FPS standard) is just that, a minimum standard. It is meant
to serve as a floor, an absolute bottom, below which conduct is not
accepted by the international community. Although the circumstances of
the case are of course relevant, the standard is not meant to vary from
state to state or investor to investor.374
C. Materiality of Terminological Variations
A critical reading of awards discloses that tribunals' view on the relevance
of terminological differences to an interpretation and application of the FPS
standard is bifurcated-there are opponents and proponents of textualism.
Their first point of disagreement centers on interpreting various patterns of
368. Id. ¶ 76.
369. Id. ¶¶77, 81.
370. Id. 11 82, 84.
371. ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, ¶ 1 (July 28, 2015), https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7O95_0.pdf
372. Id. 11 589-91, 596-99.
373. UNCITRAL, Award ¶ 1 (June 8, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
file s/case-documents/ita03 78.pdf.
374. Id. ¶ 615 (emphasis added).
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the FPS standard. Their second point centers on interpreting the beneficiary
of the standard. For both opponents and proponents, however, it is not
necessary to distinguish between "protection" and "security" as it is similarly
unnecessary to distinguish "fair" from "equitable" when dealing with "fair
and equitable" as a single and unified treatment standard.3 75
In terms of interpreting patterns of the FPS standard, the majority of
tribunals are opposed to textualism, viewing terminological differences
among formulations of the FPS standard as immaterial and having no effect
on their interpretation and application of FPS clauses. The presence or
absence of adjectives such as "full," "adequate," and "most constant" does
not affect the degree of protection the FPS standard provides.3 76 Neither does
the putting of "protection" before "security," or vice versa. "Protection"
alone can even carry the same weight as "full protection and security." "It
is generally accepted that the variation of language between the formulation
'protection' and 'full protection and security' does not make a significant
difference in the level of protection a host state is to provide."3 7 7 "Protection
and full security" is regarded as an equivalent of "full protection and
security."3 78 in spite of their textual difference, "full legal protection" for
"investors and their investments" and "full and complete protection and
security" for "investments" have been considered substantially similar.3 79
Even for "most constant," it does not elevate the level of protection and
security to a particularly high standard of treatment but stabilizes it for the
period of the investment. As the MNSS B.V. Tribunal explained:
As regards the meaning of "most constant," the plain meaning of
"constant" is "unchanging," "that remains the same." Thus, the level of
protection and security should not change for the duration of the
375. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 17, at 133.
376. Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,¶50 (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital034
.pdf; Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 630 (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf; Frontier
Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 260 (Nov. 12, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf
377. Parkerings-Companiet AS v. Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 354
(Sept. 11, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C2
52/DC682_En.pdf.
378. Compafiid de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, ¶¶ 7.4.13, 7.4.17 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0215.pdf (showing that the phrases "protection and full security" and
"full protection and security" are used interchangeably, and therefore mean the same
thing).
379. Gemplus S.A. v. Mex., Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB (AF)/04/03
& ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶ 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12 (June 16, 2010), http://icsidfiles.
worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C41/DC2112 En.pdf.
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investment. But the expression "most constant" does not increase the level
of protection and security as understood under international law. 380
Unsurprisingly, when the precise wording of the FPS clause is "the most
constant protection and security," it has still been used interchangeably with
"full protection and security. "381
In further regard to this first point of the disagreement, the minority of
tribunals emphasize that the precise legal formulations and patterns of FPS
clauses are to be taken seriously; such tribunals have come under criticism
for an overemphasis on the ordinary meaning.382 They consider the presence
of "constant" or "full" as according more protection and security to
investment than the minimum standard of treatment.38 3 "Full protection and
security" or "full security" could extend the content of the FPS standard
beyond physical security.384 Conversely, one could think that if "protection"
and "security" are not qualified by "full," they are meant to cover physical
protection and security. Against an overly extensive interpretation of the
FPS standard that might lead to an unnecessary and undesirable overlap with
other standards of protection, the Tribunal in Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona S.A., v. Argentina38 5 explicitly considered the absence
of "full," "fully," or "legal security" as supporting its interpretation that the
FPS standard was limited to physical protection and legal remedies for
physically injured investors and their assets. It did not cover a stable and
secure legal and commercial environment.38 6 When the disputed phrase was
"full physical security and protection," its scope was limited to physical
380. MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award, ¶ 351
(May 4, 2016) (footnote omitted), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc
uments/italaw731 1_0.pdf
381. See Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶¶ 3.9, 6.49, 6.119, 7.57, 7.80 (Nov. 30,
2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1071clean.pdf.
382. MONTT, supra note 17, at 305 n.57.
383. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award, ¶ 50 (June 27, 1990) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu
ments/ital034.pdf. But see Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/1 1/2, Award, ¶ 632 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7194.pdf.
384. See Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 408 (July 14,
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC507_En.pdf;
Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 729 (July 24, 2008),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC 1589_En.pd
f
385. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 1 (July 30, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita826.pdf
386. See id. ¶¶ 168-69, 173-76, 179.
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security and protection.38
Turning to the second point of their disagreement as to the term
"investment" designated as the sole beneficiary or object of FPS clauses,
some tribunals have interpreted the term textually and strictly as covering
only foreign investment or foreign assets and property in a traditional
sense.3 88 investors per se are not its beneficiaries. Thus, physical violence
to investors does not generally breach the FPS standard. "[M]easures that
affect an investor personally with no concomitant effect on the investment
do not amount to a breach of that standard of protection. "389 Nonetheless, if
the foreign investment or property at issue was willingly abandoned by an
investor, it would not be protected by the FPS standard. As the Tribunal in
Al Tamini v. Oman3 90 noted that the FPS standard "cannot extend to
providing physical protection in perpetuity to an investment that has been
expressly 'abandoned' by its owners (and over which all property rights have
long been extinguished)."3 9' Other tribunals have been less strict, implicitly
including "investor" in the meaning of "investment." They have referred to
harm to investors as violating the FPS clause despite the apparent
designation of "investments" as the sole bearer of a right to full protection
and security.3 9 2  More clearly, it has been held that full protection and
security of investment provides protection against physical harm to persons
and property.3 93
387. 01 European Grp. B.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, Award, ¶¶ 576-
77 (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
7100.pdf
388. See id. 11 577, 580; Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶
484 (Mar. 17, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
0740.pdf; Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/33, Award, ¶¶ 394, 448-49
(Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4450.
pdf; Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 624 (Dec. 15, 2014), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf; Compafiid de
Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶¶ 46, 62 (Aug.
20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf.
389. Al-Warraq, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 629.
390. ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶ 1.
391. See id. ¶ 450.
392. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award, ¶ 85(b) (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita1034.pdf; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF
)/99/2, Award, ¶ 152 (Oct. 11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita1076.pdf; MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8,
Award, 11 282, 352-56 (May 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw73 11_0.pdf; Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v.
Alb., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶ 821 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4228.pdf.
393. See Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶¶
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D. Scope Ratione Materiae of the Full Protection and Security Standard
As to the question of what it is that investment is protected and secured
from, we have divided relevant cases into three categories: cases whose
circumstances and rulings were concerned primarily with physical harms;
cases whose circumstances and rulings dealt mainly with legal harms, which
includes instances of a host state's failure to provide legal protection of
investment, its modifications of legal and regulatory frameworks, and other
regulatory acts negatively affecting the legal security and stability of
investment; and cases whose circumstances and rulings concerned both
physical and legal harms. If a tribunal, in making its rulings and obiter dicta,
gave a clear and general answer to this question of "what," we also
considered that answer a criterion for determining which category the case
belongs to.
In any case of harm to be discussed shortly, it is investors' burden to show
how materially detrimental the harms are to their investment and prove that
the harms and losses could have been prevented had host states exercised
due diligence.39 4 If they do not show that they suffer damage caused by host
states, there will be no basis for awarding damages, even if a breach of the
FPS standard is established.395 If their argument is that host states have
violated the FPS standard by failing to punish a theft of property committed
either by states themselves or by private individuals, investors' failure to
make a criminal complaint at the domestic level could lead the tribunal to
reject their claim. Such rejection is to disapprove of a "fundamental double
standard," according to which the same action is regarded as locally
immaterial but internationally material.396 Host states, in turn, cannot
622-23 (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw4009.pdf; E. Sugar B.V. v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, ¶ 203
(Mar. 27, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0259_0.
pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.v. Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 174-75 (July 30, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita826.pdf
394. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/ 11, Award, ¶¶ 164-
66 (Oct. 12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565
.pdf; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 222 (Aug.
27, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0671.pdf; see
also Al-Warraq, UNCITRAL, ¶ 626; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lith., ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 356-57 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/
icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C252/DC682_En.pdf.
395. MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award, ¶ 356
(May 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw73
11_0.pdf
396. GEA Grp. Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶¶
243-49 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAw
ards/C440/DC3408 En.pdf
60 Vol. 7:1
FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD
disregard international law and rely instead on their own law to derogate their
FPS obligation, as is generally the case with their other obligations under
international law.3 97
1. Physical Harm
Led by AAPL, 3 98 arbitral awards have traditionally construed the FPS
standard as applying exclusively or primarily to physical protection and
security of investment, that is, against physical harms to investment in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of "protection" and "security."3 99
Examples of this type of harm drawn from arbitral awards include (1) civil
unrest, civil strife, civil disturbance, and physical violence; 400 (2) threats and
attacks on investment; 4 01 (3) physical invasion of business premises or
investment sites;402 (4) rioting and looting; 403 (5) attack and seizure of
397. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.06
(Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaOO28.pdf.
398. ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶¶ 77, 86 (June 27, 1990), 4 ICSID
Rep. 246 (1997).
399. See Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/ 11/2, Award, ¶¶
632, 634 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7l94.pdf; BG Grp. Plc. v. Arg., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 324, 326 (Dec. 24,
2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaOO81.pdf; Rumeli
Telekom A.S. v. Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶¶ 668-70 (July 29, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf; E. Sugar B.V.
(Neth.) v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, ¶ 203 (Mar. 27, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0259_0.pdf; Von Pezold
v. Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, ¶¶ 582-96 (July 28, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7O95_0.pdf; Oxus
Gold v. Uzb., UNICTRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 353-54 (Dec.17, 2015), https://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7238_2.pdf; Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 173 (July 30, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0826.pdf.
400. See 01 European Grp. B.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, Award, ¶¶
576-77 (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
law7100.pdf; Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng'rs v. Alb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/21, Award, ¶¶ 1, 13 (July 30, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/ita06 18.pdf
401. See Saluka Invests. B.V. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 483-84 (Mar.
17, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita740.pdf; Am-
pal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1 1, Decision on Liability & Heads
of Loss, ¶¶ 246, 286-90 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw8487.pdf.
402. Tulip Real Estate v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/ 11/28, Award, ¶¶ 430-3 7 (Mar.
10, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3126.pdf.
403. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶ 6.07-
6.11 (Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita00
28.pdf
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property; 40 4 (6) impairment affecting the physical integrity of investment by
forceful interference; 405 (7) wrecking, looting, and dismantlement of
equipment and property; 4 06 (8) forceful expropriation of investment; 407 (9)
killings and destruction of property; 408 and (10) occupation of a building and
physical assault of the CEO. 40 9 A novel example of physical harm might be
environmental damage to investment, for example, natural damage to an
ecotourism site.4 10 On the other hand, harms found not to constitute a breach
of the FPS standard include temporary physical obstruction not tantamount
to an impairment affecting the physical integrity of investment41 ' and the
presence of the host state's armed contingents and their continued presence
at the investment site that was not harassing or threatening but was only for
peacekeeping at the site in view of protests by the workers. 4 12
2. Legal Harm
Despite its finding that the host state's non-physical action (a change in
law and administrative proceedings) did not violate the FPS standard, the
Tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic 413 stated for the first time in investment
404. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶ 80 (Dec. 8,
2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO9O2.pdf
405. See Saluka Invs., UNCITRAL, ¶ 484; Binder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, ¶ 477 (July 15, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4l79.pdf; Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Leb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Award, ¶ 229 (June 12, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ital013.pdf; Spyridon Rosssalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 362, 609 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org
/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C70/DC243 _En.pdf.
406. Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/33, Award, ¶¶ 394, 448-49 (Nov.
3, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4450.pdf.
407. Siag v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶¶ 445-48 (June 1, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf
408. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,¶ 85(b) (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
1034.pdf.
409. MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award, ¶¶ 352-55
(May 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7311 0
.pdf; Von Pezold v. Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, ¶¶ 582-96 (July 28,
2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7O95_0.pdf
410. Allard v. Barb., PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, ¶¶ 240-52 (June 27, 2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7594.pdf.).
411. Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award,¶ 229 (June 12, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
1013 .pdf
412. 01 European Grp. B.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, Award, ¶¶ 578-
79 (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
7100.pdf
413. UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 (Sept. 3, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/def
62 Vol. 7:1
FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD
arbitration that the standard guaranteed the protection of legal rights through
the availability of the host state's judicial system that endured a proper trial.
In doing so, it did not limit the standard to legal rights consequential upon
physical harms. As it explained:
The investment treaty created no duty of due diligence on the part of
[the Respondent] to intervene in the dispute between the two companies
over the nature of their legal relationships. The Respondent's only duty
under the Treaty was to keep its judicial system available for the Claimant
and any entities he controls to bring their claims, and for such claims to
be properly examined and decided in accordance with domestic and
international law.414
Shortly thereafter, the Tribunal in CME4 1 5 was more affirmative in
extending the FPS standard to legal protection. It found that a change in law
and administrative proceedings was in violation of the FPS standard. Even
in the absence of physical harms, the FPS obligation could be breached if
investments were adversely affected by the host state's regular performance
of its functions, notwithstanding its motivation.4 16 The host state deprived
the investor of legal protection by reversing its own action that approved the
partnership between the investor and its local partner, allowing the latter to
terminate the contract upon which the former relied in making its
investment. 417 As it ruled:
The Media Council's actions in 1996 and its actions and inactions in
1999 were targeted to remove the security and legal protection of the
Claimant's investment in the Czech Republic. The Media Council's
(possible) motivation to regain control of the operation of the broadcasting
after the Media Law had been amended as of January 1, 1996 is irrelevant.
The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment ofits laws
nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved
security and protection of the foreign investor's investment withdrawn or
devalued.418
Following CME, arbitral awards have interpreted the FPS standard as
extending to legal protection and security of investment,4 19 that is, against
ault/files/case-documents/ita045 1.pdf
414. Id. ¶ 314 (emphasis added).
415. UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 1 (Sept. 13, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/ita0 178.pdf
416. Id.¶¶591-92.
417. Id. ¶¶ 107, 119, 132, 474.
418. Id. ¶ 613 (emphasis added); see also CME Czech B.V. v. Czech, UNCITRAL,
Partial Arbitration Award, 16 (Sept. 11, 2001) (Hdndl J., dissenting), https://www.ital
aw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0179.pdf.
419. Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, Award,¶¶ 97(d), 281 (May 16, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docum
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legal harms to investment. A stable and secure legal and commercial
environment counts as much, and is as important as, physical security to
investors. 420  This is especially the case when "full," "fully," or "legal
security" is part of the applicable FPS clause. Breaches of investors' rights
are thus covered by the FPS standard. 421' However, that investment is
commercially lost or unsuccessful is not a ground for invoking the FPS
standard.4 22 It has been affirmed that legal protection and security does not
have to be associated with physical harms in the first place. 4 23 The existence
of physical harms is not a prerequisite for legal protection and security. 4 24 In
terms of its substance, legal protection and security covers both substantive
protection of investments and effective procedural protection in cases of
harms against investments. 425 Thus, access to fair and impartial courts-the
provision of tools for obtaining redress by the host state (a duty of
repression)-in case of nonviolence, such as contractual disputes between
investors and private persons or host states, is also within the realm of the
FPS standard.426 By "legal security," the Tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina427
defined it as "the quality of the legal system which implies certainty in its
norms and, consequently, their foreseeable application. "428 Still, this by no
ents/ita1052.pdf.
420. Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/0 1/12, Award, ¶ 408 (July 14, 2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC507_En.pdf;
Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 729 (July 24, 2008),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC 1589_En.pd
f
421. Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶¶ 406-08.
422. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 261-62,
264, 292 (Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0342.pdf
423. Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 406-07 (July 14, 2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC507_En.pdf
424. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Case No. UN 3467,
Final Award, ¶¶ 181, 183-84, 187 (July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0571 .pdf.
425. See Frontier Petroleum Servs., ¶¶ 263-64, 268.
426. Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.146 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.
org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 11 1/DC2853_En.pdf; Parkerings-Compagniet
AS v. Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 358-60 (Sept. 11, 2007),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C252/DC682_En.pd
f; Gemplus S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB (AF)/04/03 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award,¶ 9-12 (June 16, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwa
rds/C4 1/DC2112_En.pdf.
427. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 1, at 4 (Jan. 17, 2007), https://www.ita
law.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita790.pdf.
428. Id. ¶ 303.
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means indicates that host states cannot do anything that affects investment.
They can only do so with due diligence. If their conduct is beyond reproach,
the FPS claim is without merit.429
Shedding more light on a legal and business environment, the Tribunal in
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Albania430
accentuated the specificity of instances of harassment as indicating whether
the FPS standard is breached. Due diligence is to be exercised in the specific
circumstances. As a matter of fact, both the host state and the investor were
aware of smuggling, fuel adulteration, and tax evasion.43' Still, the investor
decided to make its investment under these insecure conditions. 4 32  The
Tribunal regarded such illegal activities as part of the general business
environment and investment conditions that had existed before the making
of investment.43 3 Therefore, the activities were not specific to the investor's
investment, and the allegation that they distorted the investment conditions
after the making of the investment was incorrect.434 The investor could only
expect to be protected from specific instances of harassment as opposed to
the general insecurity inherent to the investment climate:
General insecurity was also a consequence of weak government
structures and institutions at the time of the investment. [The Respondent]
was confronted with the general duty to confirm itself as a State and build
efficient institutions to combat criminality in general and smuggling, fuel
adulteration and tax evasion in particular. This is all the more so since the
incriminated activities particularly prejudiced Respondent itself . . . While
Claimant might have been entitled to expect that the general conditions of
insecurity would improve over time, it was not entitled to expect that
Respondent would protect its investment against the general insecurity
that was inherent to the investment climate as opposed to specific
instances of harassment.435
As the investor was not injured by such acts and the host state made both
national and international attempts to seriously combat them, the FPS
standard was not breached under the prevailing circumstances. 436 Similar to
429. Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶¶ 265-71
(Aug. 27, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0671.p
df
430. ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶ 1, at 1 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.ital
aw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4228.pdf.
431. Id. 823.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. 11 822-23.
435. Id. ¶ 824 (emphasis added).
436. Id. ¶¶ 825-29.
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this separation between generality and specificity of harassment instances is
that between "an objective requirement of stability, certainty and
foreseeability" and "a subjective standard reduced to the protection of
[investors'] specific expectations." 43 7
In addition to the host state's failure to keep its judicial system available
for the investor to bring claims and the host state's change of the legal
framework making the investor susceptible to negative acts by private
persons, other possible examples of legal harms include the following:
- the host state's conferral of immunity from suit for public authorities'
assaults of the investor's staff'3 8
- the host state's refusal to honor a "cover losses" provision in its
written agreement with the investor43 9
- the host state's change in its tax law interpretation and refusal to
reimburse value-added tax (VAT) paid by the investor4 40
- the host state's failure to apply the regulatory framework and the
concession agreement44 '
- the host state's illicit deprivation of the investor's access to foreign
currency indispensable for the daily operations of its subsidiaries 442
- measures that deprive investors of or restrict property or that have
similar effects 443
- the host state's allowance of wrongful application of new legislation
by its agency, failure to comply with domestic law, and breach of the
provisions of the investment agreement 444
437. Paushok v. Mong., UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶327 (Apr.
28, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0622.pdf.
438. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 151-
52 (Oct. 11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital076
.pdf.
439. Id. at ¶¶ 153-54.
440. Occidental Expl. & Co. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration, London Court of
International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, ¶¶ 181, 183-
84, 187 (July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itao5
71.pdf
441. Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 11 395-96 (July 14,
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC507_En.pdf
442. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶¶ 549-
54 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7
507.pdf.
443. Goetz v. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, ¶ 131 (Feb. 10, 1999), 6
ICSID Rep. 5 (2004).
444. AES Corp. v. Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, Award, 11 337-39 (Nov. 1,
2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8205_O.pdf
(noting, however, the Claimants failed to substantiate their FPS claim).
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- judicial wrongs (the whole trial and resultant judgments) 445
- court decisions that lack independence and impartiality446
- "the initiation of the renegotiation of the Contract [by the host state]
for the sole purpose of reducing its costs, unsupported by any declaration of
public interest, affected the legal security of [the investor's] investment" 447
- the changes made to the regulatory framework by the host state's
measures adopted to address its crisis, which resulted in the effective
dismantlement of the framework and the uncertainty reigning448
- the denial of procedural protection of the investor's right to recover
effective participation in the capital equity, the non-compliance of the host
state's court judgments by other state organs, the inability of the host state's
legal system to correct its error, or the alleged insufficiency of its courts, and
the involvement of the host state's legislative and executive branches in
decreasing the impartiality of the host state's judges or courts 4 4 9
- the amendments of the law or administrative actions causing negative
effects on investment450
- the removal of the management and the seizure of the premises by the
host state not associated with use of force but unnecessary and abusive 4 51
From the list above, the amendment of law and the efficiency of the host
state's legal system, including the availability of tools for obtaining redress,
have been elaborated with reserve. First, the FPS standard does not
completely prevent the host state from exercising its right to legislate or
regulate. Even though its legislation or regulation might adversely affect
445. Loewen Grp., Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 11 121, 241
(June 26, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0470.pdf;
Loewen Grp., Inc. v. U.S., ICSID AF Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of
Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 40-60 (Jan. 5, 2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0469.pdf
446. Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶
228 (Jan. 16, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards
/C45/DC2872_En.pdf
447. Siemens A.G. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶¶ 308-09 (Jan. 17,
2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO790.pdf
448. Nat'1 Grid PLC v. Arg., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 189 (Nov. 3,2008), https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf
449. Levy de Levi v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, 11 410, 412, 425,
430-43, 506. (Feb. 26,2014), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/Online
Awards/C 1142/DC4212 En.pdf
450. PSEG Glob. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶ 257-59 (Jan. 19,
2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C212/DC630
En.pdf
451. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 731 (July
24, 2008), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC
1589 En.pdf
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investment, the host state is not prevented from seeking recourse to it, given
that its acts are circumstantially reasonable for the purpose of reaching its
"objectively rational public policy goals." 452
To conclude that the right to constant protection and security implies that
no change in law that affects the investor's rights could take place, would be
practically the same as to recognizing the existence of a non-existent stability
agreement as a consequence of the full protection and security standard. 453
Second, for the efficiency of the host state's legal system, "[t]he question
is not whether the host State['s] legal system is performing as efficiently as
it ideally could: it is whether it is performing so badly as to violate treaty
obligations to accord fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security." 45 4
Making a functioning system of courts and legal redress available is also
not without qualification:
[N]ot every failure to obtain redress is a violation of the principle of
full protection and security. Even a decision that in the eyes of an outside
observer, such as an international tribunal, is "wrong" would not
automatically lead to state responsibility as long as the courts have acted
in good faith and have reached decisions that are reasonably tenable. In
particular, the fact that protection could have been more effective,
procedurally or substantively, does not automatically mean that the full
protection and security standard has been violated.455
Turning now to acts that have been found not to breach the FPS standard
on a case-by-case basis, the list includes the following:
- the host state's conferral of limited immunity from suit for public
authorities' tortious interference with contractual relations 45 6
- the bailout of the bank where investment was made, which is a
permissible preventive measure under the investment treaty and "falls within
the reasonable measures expected from a well administered government in
similar circumstances" 457
452. AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶
13.3.2 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/Online
Awards/C114/DC1730 En.pdf
453. Id. ¶ 13.3.5.
454. Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶
227 (Jan. 16, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards
/C45/DC2872_En.pdf
455. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 273 (Nov.
12, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf.
456. Ceskoslovenskd Obehodni Banka A.S. v. Slovk., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Award, ¶ 170 (Dec. 29, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc
uments/ita0146_0.pdf
457. Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 628 (Dec. 15, 2014), https://
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- the host state's violations of the investor's due process rights (even
when the sole beneficiary of the FPS clause is investment not investor)458
- the regulation of the sale and export of gold and the elimination of a
swap market that did not breach the FET standard459
- the declaration of bankruptcy of the company in which the investor
invested and other acts and omissions of the bankruptcy judge, the sale of
the company's asset by the bankruptcy trustee, the deletion of the company
from the commercial registry, and the failure of the host state's police and
state attorneys to carry out the criminal proceedings against the bankruptcy
trustee460
- the host state's refusal to guarantee against a price reduction caused
by its instructions 461
- the host state's passiveness toward its municipality's breach of an
agreement with the investor (the nonintervention in the legal dispute between
the investor and its municipality)462
- the amendment and implement of law on rational public policy
grounds 463
- the actions that are merely against domestic law 464
- the termination of the investment contract by the host state's
agency465
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf
458. Id.¶630.
459. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶¶ 451,
469, 470, 544, 547, 548 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files
/case-documents/italaw7507.pdf.
460. Voecklinghaus v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 40, 175, 214 (Sept. 19,
2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4182.pdf
461. Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability, ¶¶ 7.80-7.83, 7.147, 7.165 (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 111 /DC2853_En.p
df.
462. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 358,
359 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards
/C252/DC682_En.pdf
463. AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶¶
13.3.5-13.3.6 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/Cl 14/DC1730_En.pdf.
464. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 452 (Nov.
12, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf.
465. Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶
224 (Jan. 16, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/
C45/DC2872 En.pdf
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3. Physical and Legal Harms
Last, there are awards in which the FPS standard has clearly been
interpreted as covering both physical and legal protection and security, that
is, against physical and legal harms ("adverse action"). 466  Although the
standard has historically been applied and developed in physical contexts to
protect the company's officials, employees, or installations, it might, as a
matter of principle, apply in other contexts, such as "the broader ambit of the
legal and political system," overlapping in content with the FET standard
and expropriation.467 Both physical violence and "the disregard of legal
rights" are contrary to the FPS standard. 468 Textually, "full protection and
security" alone is enough to cover both physical and legal protection, given
that the definition of covered investment also includes intangible assets. 469
There is no rationale for limiting the application of the FPS standard only to
physical interferences in the absence of the contracting parties' restriction to
that effect.4 70 It covers more generally "the rights of investors." 4 7' Any act
or measure depriving investment of protection and full security counts;
harassment without physical harm or seizure is not out of its reach. 4 72 As the
Tribunal in Siemens noted:
As a general matter and based on the definition of investment, which
includes tangible and intangible assets, the Tribunal considers that the
466. Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.145 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.
org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 11 1/DC2853_En.pdf; Gemplus S.A. v. Mex.,
Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB (AF)/04/03 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶
9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12 (June 16, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/IC
SIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C41/DC2112_En.pdf; AES Summit Generation Ltd., ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/22, ¶ 13.3.2; Frontier Petroleum Servs., UNCITRAL, ¶¶ 261-64, 292;
Vannessa Ventures Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, ¶ 223.
467. Enron Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶1286, 287 (May 22,
2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf; PSEG
Glob. Inc. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶ 257-59 (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C212/DC630_En.pd
f; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 323-24 (Sept.
28, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf.
468. Vannessa Ventures Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, ¶ 223.
469. Nat'l Grid PLC v. Arg., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 187, 189 (Nov. 3, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf; Siemens A.G. v.
Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 302 (Jan. 17, 2007), https://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita790.pdf.
470. Siemens A.G., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 187, 189; Compafiid de Aguas del
Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.4.15. (Aug. 20, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf.
471. Levy de Levi v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, ¶ 406 (Feb. 26,
2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3109.pdf.
472. Compania, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, ¶¶ 7.4.15, 7.4.17.
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obligation to provide full protection and security is wider than "physical"
protection and security. It is difficult to understand how the physical
security of an intangible asset would be achieved.473
When the applicable FPS clause contains "full protection and legal
security," it is possible to interpret "full protection" as covering physical
security" and "legal security" as targeting legal harms.4 74
An illustrative example of a case in which both physical and legal harms
were discussed in tandem is Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador.475 In
this case, the investor, a concessionaire of mining concessions, suffered from
both physical hindrance by a third party and legal impossibility caused by
the host state.476 Because of the host state's failure to ensure the investor's
access to its concessions, which resulted from the anti-miners' physical
blockade of the concessions, to complete its required consultations and do
required activities for an environmental impact study ("EIS"), the Tribunal
ruled that the host state breached the FPS standard together with the FET
standard. This flowed from the facts that (1) the risk from anti-miners in the
concession area had long existed and had been evident even before the
concessions were granted to the investor and that (2) the host state's presence
in the concession area, including its police, was invariably weak,
intermittent, and ineffective.4 77 Although the local government "could
hardly have declared war on its own people, . . . it could not do nothing. "478
Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the host state did exactly what it could
not do under the BIT: it worsened the investor's already difficult situation
by making it legally impossible for the investor to carry out its EIS and do
other required activities, adopting the Suspension Resolution containing
such suspended acts, the violation of which would be criminally penalized.
In other words, the host state added legal force to the factual effect of the
physical possibility (blockade of the concessions by the anti-miners) the
investor had already suffered.479 So doing "was arbitrary, in the sense that it
was unreasonable and disproportionate at that time to side so completely
with the anti-miners as to make it impossible, both legally and physically,
for the [investor] to complete its EIS, with inevitable consequences. "480
473. Siemens A.G., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 302.
474. Id. ¶ 303.
475. PCA No. 2012-2, Award, pt. 1 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw7443.pdf
476. Id. 6.81.
477. Id.¶6.83.
478. Id.
479. Id. ¶¶ 1.106, 4.300, 6.83, 6.84.
480. Id. ¶ 6.84.
2018 71
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESSLAWREVIEW
E. Scope Ratione Personae of the Full Protection and Security Standard
As per the question of whom investment is protected and secured from, the
answer found in arbitral awards is trifurcated. Persons whose acts have been
rendered to violate the FPS standard include state organs and other entities
whose acts are attributable to states; third parties; and both state organs and
third parties. By the same logic as was used in determining the scope ratione
materiae of the FPS standard, these three categories of covered perpetrators
are based on circumstances, rulings, and obiter dicta of the cases. In every
single case, the host state, of course, is the respondent. However, in defining
the categories, we first focus on the primary perpetrators who cause harms
to foreign investment, whether it is states themselves, third parties, or both.
1. States
State organs and entities whose acts are attributable to them,4 8' can harm
investment. Their action, inaction, approval, and omission count.48 2
Examples include harms perpetrated by military,483 security forces, 48 4 armed
contingents of the national guard or police force,4 85 courts,4 86 commercial
registers,487 government authorities, 488 and employees of state entities.489
481. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,
¶ 3 (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ital034.pdf; Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶¶
6.02-6.11 (Feb. 21, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 14 (1997); Eureko B.V. v. Pol., Ad Hoc
Arbitration, Partial Award, ¶¶ 236-37 (Aug. 19, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/itaO3O8_0.pdf.
482. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, ¶ 85(b); Wena Hotels Ltd.
v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 85-95 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 ILM 881
(2002); Arif v. Mold., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, ¶¶ 504-06 (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 1740/DC3223_En.
pdf; Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1 1, Decision on Liability
and Heads of Loss, ¶ 245 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf; CME Czech B.V. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial
Award, ¶ 613 (Sept. 13, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0 178.pdf.
483. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, ¶¶ 6.07-6.11.
484. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, ¶ 3; 01 European Grp. B.V.
v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, Award, ¶ 580 (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7100.pdf.
485. OI European Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, ¶¶ 578-80; Frontier Petroleum
Servs. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 432, 436 (Nov. 12, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf
486. Frontier Petroleum Servs., ¶ 273.
487. Id.¶ 452.
488. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, ¶¶ 6.07, 6.11; Eureko
B. V., ¶¶ 236-37; OIEuropean Grp., ICSID Case No. ARB 11/25, ¶ 580.
489. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, ¶ 84 (Dec. 8, 2000),
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Host states' executive, legislative, and judicial branches are all capable of
causing harms to investment. For instance, it was found that "complaints
about lack of due process [against the host state's courts] in disputes with
private parties are better dealt with in the context of the full protection and
security standard." 49 0
2. Third Parties
Some tribunals have limited the FPS standard to third parties in general
terms or have considered it as covering third parties in accordance with the
parties' argument presented on a case-specific basis. 491' The tribunal in El
Paso Energy Co. v. Argentina492 stated clearly that the FPS standard "is a
residual obligation provided for those cases in which the acts challenged may
not in themselves be attributed to the Government, but to a third party." 493
In Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 494 the standard was extended to "the
protection of foreign investors from private parties when they act through
the judicial organs of the State." 4 95  Examples of third parties are
49649community, demonstrators, unpaid and disgruntled employees,497 and
"mobs, insurgents, rented thugs and others engaged in physical violence
against the investor in violation of the state monopoly of physical force."
498
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO9O2.pdf
490. Frontier Petroleum Servs., ¶ 296.
491. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 522
(Oct. 31, 2011), 21 ICSID Rev. 488 (2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/ita270.pdf; Oxus Gold v. Uzb., UNICTRAL, Final Award, ¶¶
353-54 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7238_2.pdf;); Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 272 (June
12, 2012) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1019.pdf;);
Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.145 (Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl071clean.pdf); E. Sugar B.V. v. Czech, SCC
Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, ¶¶ 203-07, 335 (Mar. 27, 2007), https://www.italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0259_0.pdf
492. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 1 (Oct. 31, 2011).
493. Id. ¶522.
494. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's
Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Jan. 5, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0469.pdf
495. Id. ¶58.
496. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2 Award, ¶¶ 175-77 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 158 (2004).
497. MNSS B.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award, 11 352-55
(May 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7311
0.pdf
498. E. Sugar B.V. v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, ¶ 203 (Mar. 27,
2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0259 0.pdf.
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By their failure to prevent third parties' actions that need to be prevented,
host states fail to accord full security and protection to investment. 4 99
3. States and Third Parties
The FPS standard has also been interpreted as applying equally to states
and third parties."oo Emphasis may be placed on how host states respond to
harms inflicted either by themselves or third parties. As the Tribunal in
Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt"o' elaborated:
The duty imposed by the international standard is one that rests upon
the State. However, since it concerns an obligation of diligence, the
Tribunal is of the view that the operation of the standard does not depend
upon whether the acts that give rise to the damage to the Claimants'
investment are committed by agents of State (which are thus directly
attributable to the State) or by third parties. Rather the focus is on the
acts or omissions of the State in addressing the unrest that gives rise to
the damage.502
Compared with the FET standard, which requires host states to behave
fairly and equitably, the FPS standard requires host states to provide "a legal
framework that grants security and protects the investment against adverse
action by private persons as well as state organs. "503
F. Relation to Other Standards and Principles
In arbitral awards, the FPS standard has been found to be closely related
499. Id.
500. Suez, Sociedad Gen. de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., v. Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 173 (July 30, 2010), 21
ICSID Rev. 342 (2006); Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11,
Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 245 (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf; Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v. Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 355, (Sept. 11, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/documents/Pakerings.pdf; Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 730 (July 24, 2008), https://www.ita
law.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf; Gemplus S.A., SLP S.A.,
Gemplus Indust. S.A. de C.V. v. Mex., Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB
(AF)/04/03 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶ 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12 (June 16, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0357.pdf); AES Summit
Generation Ltd. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 13.3.2 (Sept. 23, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0014_0 .pdf; Paushok v.
Mong., UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 327 (Apr. 28, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0622.pdf
501. ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, ¶ 1.
502. Id. ¶ 245 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
503. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 296 (Nov.
12, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf).
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to or even "integrated" with other standards of treatment,504 for example, the
FET standard, the MFN treatment standard, the protection against
unreasonable or discriminatory measures, expropriation, and the general
provision on protection. Whether tribunals would deal with their relation in
detail or deny doing so ab initio has largely depended on the principle they
adopted, that is, the principle of effectiveness or procedural economy,
respectively.
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Besides the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
discussed earlier, it is the FET standard that is often cited as relevant to the
FPS standard. Before considering how they are related, it is indispensable
to have a basic understanding of the former sufficient to allow for a
comparative analysis. For this purpose, we adopt the widely accepted and
influential explanation put forward in Ticnicas Medioambientales Teemed,
S.A. v. Mexico,505 according to which the FET standard was described in the
following terms:
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement,
in light of the good faith principle established by international law,
requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into
account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign
investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations
that will governs its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its
investment and comply with such regulations .... The foreign investor
also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e., without arbitrarily
revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were
relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan
and launch its commercial and business activities. The investor also
expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the
investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually
assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor for its
investment without the required compensation.506
Similar to our prior discussion on the relation between the FPS standard
504. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 1, Award, ¶ 182 (Oct.
12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf.
505. ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 1 (May 29, 2003), https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0854.pdf
506. Id. ¶ 154.
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and customary international law, awards deliberating the FPS and FET
standards are trifurcated. Advocates, opponents, and passivists of the
distinction between the FPS standard and the FET standard have their own
ways of addressing them.
For advocates, the two standards are distinct.o7 A finding that the FET
standard is violated does not necessarily entail a breach of the FPS
standard,os and vice versa. Thus, it is incumbent upon claimants to
separately prove that the FPS standard is also violated after a breach of the
FET has been established. To hold otherwise would be contradictory to the
principles of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties ("VCLT"). Rejection of an FET claim does not dictate that of
the FPS standard.509 In applying BITs where both standards were clearly
addressed in separate articles, a tribunal strongly rejected an argument that
if the FET standard was breached, the FPS standard was ipso facto violated.
Having failed to prove how the respondent's acts and omissions were in
breach of its obligation, the claimant was unsuccessful in making its FPS
claim.1 o In some cases, the parties to the dispute addressed the FPS claim
and the FET claim separately at the outset. They did not rely on the same
set of facts as concurrently constituting breaches of both standards. Nor did
they treat the claims as alternatives of each other."'
Having affirmed that the two standards are not coterminous but
complementary, several tribunals rendered each of them applicable to a
different perpetrator of harm. Unless the applicable BIT provides otherwise,
the FET standard protects investment against a state's acts, whereas the FPS
507. Jan de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, ¶ 269 (Nov. 6,
2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0440.pdf; Electra
bel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable
Law and Liability, ¶¶ 7.80-7.83, 7.147, 7.165 (Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 1071 clean.pdf; Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v.
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Award, 11 216, 224, 226-28 (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1250.pdf).
508. Gemplus S.A., v. Mex., Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB (AF)/04/03
& ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶ 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12 (June 16, 2010), https://www.italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0357.pdf
509. Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v. Alb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/24, Award, ¶¶ 819-20 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/def
ault/files/case-documents/italaw4228.pdf
510. Arif v. Mong., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, 11 504-06 (Apr. 8, 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl370.pdf; Ulysseas,
Inc. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 272 (June 12, 2012), https://www.italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital019.pdf
511. See generally Allard v. Barb., PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, ¶¶ 169-228, 232-
52 (June 27, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
7594.pdf
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standard protects against those of a third party not attributable to the state in
the context of use of force.512 The latter does not guarantee investment
against unfair and inequitable treatment caused by a third party, including
state-owned commercial entities that operate independently in accordance
with commercial law and practice.5 13
Specifically presented with the phrase "fully and completely protected ...
in accordance with the principle ofjust and equitable treatment in Article 3"
in one applicable BIT, the Tribunal in Suez considered whether breaches of
the FET and FPS standards are necessarily simultaneous.5 14 It found that
they were not, saying that:
[T]he concept of full protection and security is included within the
concept of fair and equitable treatment, but that the scope of full protection
and security is narrower than the fair and equitable treatment. Thus, State
action that violates the full protection and security clause would of
necessity constitute a violation of fair and equitable treatment under
the ... BIT. On the other hand, all violations of fair and equitable
treatment are not automatically also violations of full protection and
security . . . . [I]t is possible for [the Respondent] to violate its obligation
of fair and equitable treatment toward the Claimants without violating its
duty of full protection and security. In short, there are actions that violate
fair and equitable treatment that do not violate full protection and
security.
The same tribunal ruled that the FET and FPS standards were separate and
applicable to different situations. The former applies to business
environment and legal security while the latter is aimed at physical harm,
punishment, and remedies:
The fact that the . . . BIT employs the fair and equitable treatment
standard and the full protections and security standard in two distinct
articles and refers to them as separate and distinct standards leads to the
conclusion that the Contracting Parties must have intended them to mean
two different things. Thus, in interpreting these two standards of investor
treatment it is desirable to give effect to that intention by giving the two
concepts distinct meanings and fields of application. 516
512. Oxus Gold v. Uzb., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 353-54 (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7238_2.pdf; E. Sugar
B.V. v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, ¶¶ 204-07, 335 (Mar. 27, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0259_0 .pdf
513. Oxus Gold, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 353-54.
514. See Suez, Sociedad Gen. de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 170-71 (July 30, 2010), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita826.pdf
515. Id.¶171.
516. Id. 172.
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The Tribunal continued:
In this respect, this Tribunal is of the view that the stability of the
business environment and legal security are more characteristic of the
standard of fair and equitable treatment, while the full protection and
security standard primarily seeks to protect investment from physical
harm. This said, this latter standard may also include an obligation to
provide adequate mechanisms and legal remedies for prosecuting the
State organs or private parties responsible for the injury caused to the
investor.5 1 7
For opponents, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the FPS and FET
standards. A breach of one shows a breach of the other. One tribunal
regarded the obligations imposed by the two standards as legally distinct but
unnecessary to be distinguished. Unfair and inequitable treatment also
breaches the FPS standard.519 To exemplify, by undermining the stability of
the legal and business framework of the investment through changes in tax
law, which were followed by ambiguity and inconsistency, one respondent
was found to be in violation of its FET obligation. And such violation
simultaneously indicated its failure to comply with the FPS standard: 520 "[A]
treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically entails an absence of
full protection and security of the investment." 521 In contrast, measures
formalized in laws and regulations that are not in breach of the FET standard
do not imply a breach of the FPS standard.5 22
Conversely, the host state's violation of the FPS standard automatically
breaches the FET standard.52 3 When the wording used is "investments ...
shall enjoy . .. protection and full security in accordance with the principle
of fair and equitable treatment," it covers "any act or measure which deprives
an investor's investment of protection and full security, providing . .. the act
517. Id. ¶ 173 (emphasis added).
518. Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2, Award, ¶ 6.82
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7443.
pdf.
519. Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 11 406-08 (July 14,
2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0061.pdf
520. Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award,¶¶ 181, 183-84, 187 (July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0571.pdf
521. Id.¶187.
522. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶¶ 451,
469-70, 544, 547-48 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7507.pdf.
523. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 83, 95 (Dec.
8, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0902.pdf; Copp-
er Mesa Mining Corp., PCA Case No. 2012-2, ¶ 6.85.
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or measure also constitutes unfair and inequitable treatment."524 This
relational explanation suggests the trend toward the integration of standards
of treatment, viewing the FET and FPS standards, along with other standards,
as integrated. One possible interpretation of the FPS standard that was
preceded by the FET standard in the same BIT is that the FET standard is "a
more general standard which finds its specific application in, inter alia, the
duty to provide full protection and security. "525
Finally, passivists have no need to delve into a discussion of the relation
between the FPS and FET standards. They have found it unnecessary to deal
with the FPS standard separately after a violation of the FET standard has
been established, and vice versa. This is the case regardless of whether the
claimant referred to the same facts already giving rise to a breach of the FET
standard or different facts specifically alleged as in breach of the FPS
standard.526 An arbitral finding that the host state violated the FET standard
by adopting the ban on profits and the ban on transfers of portfolio that
deprived the claimant of access to the commercial value of its investment
disposes of the FPS claim.527 However, passivists have not denied the
possible relation between them in toto. As observed in Binder v. Czech
Republic, 528 "[ifn so far as the 'full protection and security' clause should be
considered to provide further protection, it is difficult to see how such
protection would go beyond that of the clause on 'fair and equitable
treatment. "'529
524. Compafiid de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, ¶ 7.4.15 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc
uments/ita02O6.pdf
525. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 1, Award, ¶ 182 (Oct.
12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf.
526. See Valeri Belokon v. Kyrgyz Rep., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 254 (Oct. 24, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ITA%20LAW%207008_0.pdf; PSEG Glob. v. Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/5, Award, ¶ 259 (Jan. 19, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICS
IDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C212/DC630_En.pdf; Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 291 (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf; Impregilo
S.p.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶¶ 331, 334 (June 21, 2011), http://
icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 109/DC217 _En.pdf
527. See Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Rep., PCA Case No. 2008-13, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, ¶¶ 259-63, 279, 284 (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files
/case-documents/italaw3206.pdf.
528. UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 1 (July 15, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4179.pdf
529. Id. ¶ 477; see also PSEG Glob. v. Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶
257-59 (Jan. 19, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/Online
Awards/C212/DC630_En.pdf; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 323-24 (Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/IC
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Having found that the respondent violated the FET standard by its "string
of measures of coordinated harassment by [its] various institutions,"530 the
Tribunal in Stati v. Kazakhstan5 3 ' deemed it superfluous to consider the
claimant's argument that the "most constant protection and security"
standard was stronger than "full protection and security" and extended to
both physical protection and legal security.53 2 This is because once the relief
was granted on the basis of the FET standard, it was no longer necessary to
further consider if the same relief would to be granted on the basis of the FPS
standard in the absence of any other relief not entailed by the violation of the
FET standard. The tribunal admitted that the FET and FPS standards
overlapped. However, to what extent they did so remains arguable.533
2. Effectiveness and Procedural Economy
Whether in dealing with the FPS and FET standards separately or in
refusing to address them in tandem, tribunals have not lacked for underlying
principles. In ruling that the two standards are not coterminous, tribunals
have referred to the principle of effectiveness (la r~gle de l'effet utile) to
justify their distinction. According to the principle:
[A]ll provisions of the treaty . . . must be supposed to have been
intended to have significance and to be necessary to convey the intended
meaning; that an interpretation which reduces some part of the text to the
status of a pleonasm, or mere surplusage, is prima facie suspect. 534
Construing the FPS standard more extensively entails its overlap with the
FET standard, depriving the latter of its meaning. So doing is thus
SIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C8/DC694_En.pdf
530. Stati v. Kaz., SCC Case No. V (116/2010), Award, ¶ 1095 (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3083.pdf.
531. Id. ¶ 1.
532. See id. 11 1233-43.
533. See id. 11 1254-57.
534. See I HUGH THIRLWAY, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: FIFTY YEARS OF JURISPRUDENCE 293 (2013) (explaining that the other
meaning of the principle of effectiveness (la rkgle de 1'efficacite) is that "the instrument
as a whole, and each of its provisions, must be taken to have been intended to achieve
some end, and that an interpretation which would make the text ineffective to achieve
the object in view is, again, prima facie suspect. . . . [It] is however also conveniently
defined by the adage ut res magis valeat quam pereat"); JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 97 (3d ed. 2003) (defining effet utile as a
teleological interpretation, according to which the object and purpose of a treaty, as well
as the context thereof, will be considered in interpreting its terms in a way that furthers
the object and purpose to make the treaty more effective); see also JOHN P. GRANT & J.
CRAIG BARKER, PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
177 (3d ed. 2009).
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inconsistent with the principle of effet utile.5 3 5 To comply with it, the
distinction between them is to be maintained.536
To deny addressing the FPS and FET standards separately, tribunals'
justification rests on the principle of procedural economy,537 according to
which any unnecessary repetition of proceedings and judicial organs' waste
of energy538 should be avoided. Similar to other international courts that
have also applied the principle,53 9 investment tribunals have sought recourse
to it in refusing to address the FET standard after establishing a violation of
the FPS standard, and vice versa. Their application of the principle may be
accompanied by (1) the absence of greater relief sought by claimants relying
specifically on the FPS standard and/or (2) the non-impact of tribunals'
further findings on the determination of the resulting damages.5 4 0
3. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
If the FPS standard under consideration is in the form of a narrow FPS
clause, the most-favored-nation treatment can be invoked. Claimants'
typical argument would be that their narrowly worded FPS clause in the BIT
could be broadened by the operation of the MFN clause in the same BIT. As
a result, they could avail themselves of the broadly worded FPS clause
535. Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶¶
634-35 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
7194.pdf; Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶¶ 7.80-7.83, 7.147, 7,165 (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 111 /DC2853_En.p
df
536. Oxus Gold v. Uzb., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 353-54 (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7238_2.pdf
537. Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on
Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 291 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf.
538. Luca Mezzetti, Human Rights, Between Supreme Court, Constitutional; Court
and Supranational Courts: The Italian Experience, in THE CONVERGENCE OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN EUROPE 29, 51 (Rainer Arnold ed. 2016).
539. SERENA FORLATI, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL ORA JUDICIAL BODY? 63 n.27 (2014).
540. See R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 238 (June
29, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C 116/DC
2572_En.pdf; Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11,
Award, ¶ 456 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C80/DC2672_En.pdf; Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/2, Award, ¶ 538 (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italawl272.pdf; Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 34877, Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 275 (Mar. 30, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita015 1.pdf; Standard
Chartered Bank v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/12, Award, ¶¶ 272-73 (Nov. 2, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 1184.pdf.
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contained in another BIT. This tends to be the case if tribunals take
terminological variations seriously. For instance, "protection and security"
could be replaced by "full protection and security." Also, "adequate
protection and security" in one BIT could be replaced by seemingly more
favorable "full protection and security" in another BIT by virtue of the MFN
clause. After such replacement, however, it does not necessarily mean that
there would be a substantive difference in the degree of protection.5 4 1
Similarly, as between full protection and security that is qualified by
reference to international law and unqualified full protection and security, it
has been found unnecessary to consider whether they are replaceable through
the MFN clause. This is because there is no sufficient evidence that their
interpretation would be different.5 42
4. Protection Against Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures
Tribunals have either discouraged or encouraged distinguishing between
a provision on protection against unreasonable or discriminatory measures
and the FPS standard. In arguing against making such a distinction, the
Tribunal in Lauder referred to its prior finding on prohibition against
arbitrary and discriminatory measures as also applying to its consideration
of whether the FPS standard was fulfilled.5 43 For the Tribunal in Noble
Ventures, Inc. v. Romania,5 44 both the prohibition against arbitrary and
discriminatory measures and the FPS standard were equally specific
applications of the FET standard.5 45 However, the Tribunal in Eureko B. V.
v. Slovak Republic5 46 implied that the two standards were not always the
same, noting that "[t]he right to full protection and security subsists for as
long as the investment remains in place . .. no matter whether or not the
treatment complained of is discriminatory." 5 47
541. See Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 630 (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf.
542. See Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶
632, n.862 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7194.pdf
543. Lauder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 310 (Sept. 3, 2001), https://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita045 1.pdf.
544. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 2, at 9 (Oct. 12, 2005), https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf
545. See id. ¶ 182.
546. PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶¶
1-4, at 1. (Oct. 26, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
0309.pdf
547. Id. ¶ 260.
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5. Expropriation
At least four types of relationships between the FPS standard and
expropriation have been established by arbitral tribunals: (1) the compliance
with the FPS standard is an element of lawful expropriation; (2) the FPS
standard need not be addressed if expropriation is confirmed, and vice versa;
(3) the FPS standard is breached if expropriation is established; and (4) the
FPS standard is not automatically violated by the mere existence of
expropriation. Each type of relationship has been explained in the following
way.
In some BITs, a host state's granting of full protection and security is not
only for fulfilling its FPS obligation per se but also for determining the
lawfulness of its expropriation, because the compliance with the FPS
standard, inter alia, is a decisive factor of lawful expropriation. Thus, it
could be the case that although a tribunal has found that it had no jurisdiction
ratione materiae over an investor's separate FPS claim,5 48 it could consider
whether the FPS standard was observed. This is because the tribunal has
jurisdiction over an expropriation claim, the consideration of which dictated,
in accordance with effet utile, against ignoring whether the FPS standard was
breached. Still, doing so is not to allow the investor to revive its FPS claim
"through the back door." 549
A second type of relationship between the FPS standard and expropriation
arises out of the argument that the host state unlawfully expropriated
investment and breached the FPS standard. In such a situation, the investor
in Vestey Group Ltd. v. Venezuela,so for instance, stated that if the tribunal
upheld its unlawful expropriation claim "with the natural damages
consequences," it did not need to decide the FPS claim.5 5 ' For the host state,
the FPS claim was subsumed in the unlawful expropriation claim "as, once
compensation is determined for the taking, 'there can be, virtually by
definition, no loss or damage left to be compensated separately based on a
breach of other, lesser standards."' 5 52 Based on the investor's statement and
the principle of procedural economy as well as its finding of the host state's
unlawful expropriation, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to address the FPS
548. See Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 342 (June 2, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/O
nlineAwards/C300/DC2777_En.pdf
549. Id. ¶155, 163-66; Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-
2, Award, ¶ 6.85 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7443.pdf.
550. ICSID Case No. ARB/06/4, Award, ¶¶ 1-5, at 6 (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.ita
law.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7230.pdf.
551. Id. 207.
552. Id. ¶ 317 (footnote omitted).
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and other claims.553 Conversely, a finding that the host state violated the FPS
standard could render the tribunal's consideration of an expropriation claim
unnecessary.554
A third type of relationship arises when unlawful expropriation itself is
considered as constituting a breach of the FPS standard. There is a case in
which the host state allowed the investors' investment to be forcibly
expropriated regardless of their explicit pleas for police protection and failed
to return it to them in accordance with its own courts' decisions affirming
the illegality of the expropriation. Therein, the Tribunal found that the host
state violated its obligation to provide full protection.5 5 5 It considered the
host state's conduct "the most egregious element in the whole affair." 556
As for the last type of relationship, the existence of expropriation has been
found not to indicate that there had been a breach of the FPS standard. 557
6. Full Protection and the Full Protection and Security Standard
As noted in Part II, Section E, some investment treaties have two separate
full protection clauses. The first is articulated first, at the beginning of the
treaty, providing investments with "full protection." The second clause
follows, granting investments "full protection and security." The Tribunal
in Binder expressed doubt as to why the two clauses were included in the
same treaty.55' Regarding their relation, the Tribunal in Toto Costruzioni
Generali S.p.A. v. Lebanon559 opined that the latter strongly overlapped the
former. The claim that did not fall within the scope of full protection was
also outside of that of full protection and security.560
553. Id.¶318.
554. See Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1 1, Decision on
Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 291 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf
555. Siag v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶¶ 445-48 (June 1, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf
556. Id. ¶448.
557. Gemplus S.A. v. Mex., Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB (AF)/04/03
& ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶ 9-9 to -12 (June 16, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0357.pdf
558. Binder v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 173-74, 474 (July 15, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4179.pdf.
559. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, ¶ 1 (June 7, 2012), https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital013.pdf
560. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 2.3
n. 431, n.272 supp. 292, Italy-Leb., Nov. 19, 1999 (noting that "[e]ach Contracting Party
shall protect within its territory investments made in accordance with its laws and
regulations by investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair by
unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
extension, sale or liquidation of such investments ... [i]nvestments by investors of either
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V. OVERALL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We start this part with our factor analysis, correlating past decisions that
addressed the FPS standard, mainly in the FCN and BITs contexts, with
conditions that influenced them. Then we consider whether such contexts
have changed significantly and whether they have affected an interpretation
and application of the FPS standard. Next, we will predict which
international law participants should or will act. Our survey of different
decision options and our scrutiny of the prospective aggregate value
consequences of each act in terms of the interpretation and application of the
FPS standard allow us to select and adjust specific recommendations.56 '
Finally, we will propose alternatives and recommendations on how the FPS
standard should be understood.5 62 Salient and problematic issues will be
analyzed and accompanied by preferred policy alternatives and
recommendations. They are related to the genesis of the FPS standard,
terminological variations, covered harms, covered perpetrators, due
diligence, and the relation of the FPS standard to other standards.
A. The Genesis of the Full Protection and Security Standard
Our historical review leads us to the conclusion that the FPS standard
existed earlier than previously estimated in mainstream literature on the
topic. Early civilizations were antagonistic to foreigners, viewing them
unfavorably as outsiders, enemies, and, sometimes, non-human beings,
bearing no rights or legal capacity. This antagonism arose from physical and
psychological causes, such as their population density, natural conditions,
racial distinction, moral and intellectual capacity, religious motives, culture,
and national exclusivity. 563 However, political and economic necessities
were among the factors that ameliorated the treatment of foreigners and set
the trend toward internationalism, encouraging "an increasingly liberal grant
of individual safe-conducts."564
Thus, in ancient political and economic contexts, the seed of the FPS
standard was planted no later than during the making of treaties in ancient
Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other
Contracting Party"); Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12,
Award, ¶ 171.
561. See Reisman, supra note 13, at 123-24.
562. See Id.
563. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 7; 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 122-26
(highlighting the impact of population density, racial traits, and national exclusivity).
564. Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 19; see also 1 PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at
267 (noting that treaties for commerce, peace, and alliance provided benefits that led to
a reduction in hostilities towards foreigners and an increase in capacity to adjudicate
disputes with foreigners).
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Greece. It then germinated for millennia, having grown steadily in various
kinds of treaties, especially treaties of commerce. Next, there emerged in
the customary international law of aliens a general duty to provide foreign
nationals with full protection and security. In general, this lengthy process
is accurately described by Schwarzenberger in the following way:
[T]he detailed clauses, in which provision was made for the protection
of the person, dignity, life and property of foreign merchants gradually
coalesced into a wider rule. Originally, on a treaty basis and,
subsequently, under international customary law, it came to cover all
nationals abroad and be known as the minimum standard of international
law on the treatment of foreign nationals. 565
In particular, in the field of international investment law, one example of
an application of such customary international law was described as follows:
It is a generally accepted rule of international law, clearly stated in
international awards and judgments and generally accepted in the
literature, that a State has a duty to protect aliens and their investment
against unlawful acts committed by some of its citizens . . . . If such acts
are committed with the active assistance of state-organs a breach of
international law occurs. 566
The FPS standard has continued to make its way into modern treaties of
FCN and investment treaties as a treaty provision either with or without
reference to international law. From this, it can be said that the FPS standard
has overlapped with the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment.567 Based on our historical findings, we conclude that it is not true
that treaties protecting aliens and their property were only recently
developed. 5 68 Nor is it true that the FPS standard had its origin in post-war
bilateral treaties.569
To be more specific about its early appearance, while it has been asserted
elsewhere that "the FPS standard was seen as early as the 1833 Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Chile,"570
565. Id. at 67 (describing the lengthy process).
566. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indon., ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Award, ¶ 172 (Nov. 20,
1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413.
567. VANDEVELDE, supra note 149, at 226, 243.
568. But see FRANCK, supra note 187, at 457 (arguing that the treaties protecting aliens
and their property originated later in time).
569. But see Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
Award, ¶ 123 (Oct.11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ital076.pdf (citing UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990s 53-
55 (1998)).
570. David Collins, Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of
International Investment Law to Digital Assets, 12 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 225, 228
(2011).
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archival research indicates otherwise. The preceding century had already
witnessed the FPS standard being included in treaties of commerce and
navigation that were concluded in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
One example is the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between
His Britannic Majesty and the United States of 1794, Article XIV of which
provided merchants and traders on each side with "the most complete
protection and security for their commerce." 7 ' The identical phrase
appeared in Article I of A Convention to Regulate the Commerce between
the Territories of the United States and of his Britannick Majesty of 1815572
and Article III of A Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States of 183 1.573
Similar phrases-"the most complete security and protection for the
transaction of their business" and "the same security and protection as the
natives of the country wherein they reside"-were included in Article I of
the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States and
Sweden and Norway of 1816574 and Article 1 of the treaty of 1828 between
the United States and Prussia,7 5 respectively. In brief, our historical account
showing the existence of ancient treaties and the foregoing 1794 treaty run
counter to the mainstream position that the root of the FPS standard can be
traced back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 576
B. Terminological Variations
Literally, it can be seen that "protection and security," "full protection and
security," "adequate protection and security," "constant protection and
security," "most constant protection and security," among others, are not
identical and seems to carry unequal weight. On the face of it, such different
formulations intuitively suggest difference in degree of protection and
security provided. However, they do not necessarily produce significantly
different results. This is because the quintessence of the terms used remains
"protection and security," which is, as we will see shortly, enough to protect
and secure investments. Greater emphasis should be place on "protection
and security" rather than their positive adjectives, which should be
571. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation art. 14, supra note 106.
572. Convention to Regulate the Commerce art. 1, U.K.-U.S., July 3, 1815.
573. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation art. 3, Mex.-U.S., Apr. 5, 1831, 8
Stat. 410.
574. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce art. 1, Nor.-Swed.-U.S., Sept. 4, 1816, 8
Stat. 232.
575. 3 HACKWORTH, supra note 137, at 571.
576. See SALACUSE, supra note 4, at 231; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 17, at
161; MONTT, supra note 17, at 69-70, 302 n.40; Vandevelde, supra note 17, at 204.
2018 87
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESSLAWREVIEW
interpreted as enhancing, not reducing, the protection and security provided
by the FPS standard. Alternatively, if various formulations of FPS clauses
were drafted in a way that really lead to their different meaning, the MFN
clause in the same BITs could properly modify the scope of the FPS standard
by importing a more favorable FPS clause from another BIT. For instance,
if the FPS clause in BIT A is clearly limited to physical harms, it can be
extended to legal harms that are covered by the FPS clause in BIT B through
the operation of the MFN clause in BIT A.
As for the beneficiary of the FPS standard or the object of protection, the
ordinary meaning of "investment" and "investor" should be maintained in
accordance with the nature of international investment protection.
When "investment" has been designated as the sole bearer of the right to
full protection and security, investors should not benefit therefrom especially
in relation to their personal or human aspects unless harms to them also
adversely affect their investment. Thus, it is right to hold that "measures that
affect an investor personally with no concomitant effect on the investment
do not amount to a breach of standard of protection [granted only to its
investment]."" In this scenario, it is still possible and consistent with legal
methodology for investors to enjoy protection and security by invoking
customary international law or to invoke the MFN clause to avail themselves
of personal protection. Had host states intended to extend treaty-based full
protection and security to investors, they could easily have done so by
explicitly referring to both "investors and their investments," as is the case
with some BITs. 17
When "investor" has been made the beneficiary of the FPS standard, it is
by no means manifestly absurd or unreasonable to give protection to their
investments. This is nothing more than protecting investors in accordance
with the nature of things, giving them protection of life, liberty, and property
(investment), as the great "Lockean trinity" calls for. Still, for the sake of
clarity, the parties to BITs could be more specific in nominating the
beneficiary of the FPS standard.
C. Covered Harms
It perhaps goes without saying that drafting FPS clauses as clearly as
possible is highly recommended. This recommendation is blunt but
practical. Parties to investment treaties can limit the FPS standard to either
577. Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 629 (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf.
578. See, e.g., Gemplus S.A. v. Mex., Talsud S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case Nos. ARB
(AF)/04/03 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶ 9-9, 9-12 (June 16, 2010), http://icsidfiles.
worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C41/DC2112 En.pdf.
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a physical or legal aspect of protection and security. Otherwise, the FPS
standard should be interpreted as applying to both physical and legal harms
as much as the nature of covered investments and/ or investors permits them
to be so protected and secured. Measures that destabilize investments' legal
and business environments count as much as measures that physically harm
them. In our view, legal protection and security can be either consequential
upon or independent of physical harms; it is not limited only to preventing
or prosecuting acts that threaten or impair the physical safety of investments.
This remains our position even in cases where "protection and security"
alone is used in the applicable FPS clause. Our position is based on (1) the
ordinary meaning of "protection" and "security," their context, and the object
and purpose of investment treaties; (2) a historical analysis of the FPS
standard; and (3) past domestic and international judicial decisions that
rationally found the FPS standard applicable beyond physical harms.
Regarding the ordinary meanings of "protection" and "security," the terms
adopted to express the intention of the parties to investment treaties, each is
too broad to exclusively mean physical harms. The ordinary meaning of
"protection" is "[t]he action of protecting, or the state of being protected."5 7 9
For "security," its ordinary meaning is "[t]he state of being free from danger
or threat."so "Protecting" and "being protected" are not qualified by
"physically" or "legally." Likewise, neither "danger" nor "threat" is
qualified by "physical" or "legal." Thus, there is no compelling reason to
interpret the FPS standard to cover only one side of protection and security.
Even without seeking recourse to the evolutionary interpretation of treaties,
according to which the meaning of treaty terms can evolve over times,"' our
interpretation is sustained. Afortiori, if brought into play, such interpretation
can concretize our position, given the velocity of changes in the international
investment law context.
Considering the ordinary meaning of "protection" and "security" in their
context and in light of the object and purpose of investment treaties confirms
our position. As part of their context, the definition of covered investments
includes both tangible and intangible assets. Protection and security granted
to them have to correspond to their nature. It is difficult to discern how
intangible investments, such as claims to money and intellectual properties,
given their intangibility, can enjoy physical protection and security. The
protection and security that their intangibility allows them to receive is a
579. Protection, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
protection (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
580. Security, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
security (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
581. See EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 1 (2014).
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legal one. This is in line with the argument that the FPS standard should
apply to digital assets, safeguarding investors in the twenty-first century
against modern security threats.5 82
Of course, we are aware that other provisions in the same investment
treaties that provide for other standards of treatment, especially the FET
standard, are also part of the context as much as is the definition of
investments. And we do not suggest that one context outweighs another or
should receive more attention; they all should be considered. 583 In light of
the prototypical object and purpose of investment treaties usually found in
their preamble, to mutually promote or encourage and protect foreign
investment, the ordinarily broad meaning of "protection" and "security" in
their context are at least not barred or at most affirmed. When the object and
purpose of investment treaties is to create and maintain favorable conditions
for investments, our position remains the same, i.e., the FPS standard should
cover legal protection. This is because, as Professor Reisman rightly
elaborates, such conditions "are comprised of more than natural phenomena,
such as climate, ecology, geography, and natural and human resources.
Critically, 'favorable conditions' must also encompass appropriate internal
legal, administrative, and regulatory arrangements, conducted through
procedures designed to ensure that the arrangements are applied as they are
supposed to be applied." 58 4 Thus, while it has been held elsewhere that
including within the FPS standard legal protection cannot be induced by the
wording of the treaty but "a distinct philosophy of property protection,"5 15
we believe otherwise. It is the wording of the treaties read in its context
considering the object and purpose of the treaties that can properly produce
such inclusion. They do not leave the meaning of the FPS standard
ambiguous or obscure. Nor do they lead to a result that is manifestly absurd
or unreasonable. Thus, there is no need to seek recourse to supplementary
means of interpretation, considering the preparatory work of investment
treaties and the circumstances of their conclusion.
Second, contrary to the traditional view that the FPS standard has
exclusively applied to physical security, our research shows that the FPS
standard has also related to legal protection since its origin in the treaties of
ancient Greece. It has not been limited to physical harms to persons and
582. See Collins, supra note 570, at 225.
583. But see Lorz, supra note 10, at 770 (referring only to other standards of
protection when explaining the context of a treaty).
584. W. Michael Reisman, The Future of International Investment Law and
Arbitration, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
275, 278 (Antonio Cassese ed. 2012).
585. SORNARAJAH, supra note 230, at 360.
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property of foreigners. Criticizing other tribunals for failing to take a
historical analysis of the concept of the FPS standard into account, the
Tribunal in Suez itself did what it blamed others for doing. Relying on its
incomplete historical analysis of the FPS standard, the Tribunal ruled that
the standard applies only to physical harms and, at most, to legal redress
consequential upon such harms.5 86 Had it thoroughly surveyed the FPS
concept, it could have seen that the FPS standard has also been tied to legal
protection. Notably, foreigners' access to local courts in general is among
the various kinds of legal protection that have also been part of the concept
of the FPS standard at the outset. Others falling well within the same realm
include their right to be heard by their own foreign judges, to freedom of
speech, movement, and religion, and to safe communication.
Ancient Rome's jus gentium serves well as evidence of its openness to
foreigners, allowing them to enjoy both rights in rem and in personam.
Foreigners could claim the heritage of their forerunners located in another
land upon a payment of tax. Legal protection in ancient political and
commercial contexts was not necessarily a consequence of physical
harms.' In the subsequent political and commercial contexts where FCN
treaties incidentally protected investment, legal protection was already
beyond doubt. An important piece of historical evidence that the FPS
standard was understood as covering legal protection can be found in An
Additional and Explanatory Convention to the Treaty of Peace, Amity,
Commerce and Navigation of 1832 between the United States and Chile of
1833. Therein, the parties clarified the meaning of the FPS clause in Article
X of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 1832 in
Article II as follows:
It being agreed by the [tenth] article of the aforesaid treaty, that the
citizens of the United States of America, personally or by their agents,
shall have the right of being present at the decisions and sentences of the
tribunals, in all cases which may concern them, and at the examination of
witnesses and declarations that may be taken in their trials ... 588
Thus, we do not subscribe to the view that the historical origins of the FPS
standard support limiting its application only to physical harms. 58 9 In the
present context of international investment in which investment treaties
586. Suez, Sociedad Gen. de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 177 (July 30, 2010), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf.
587. See generally supra Part II.A and B.
588. An Additional and Explanatory Convention to the Treaty of Peace, Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, supra note 125, art. 2.
589. But see VANDEVELDE, supra note 149, at 253.
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purposely protect investment, legal protection is even more secured and can
be wider in its scope.
Third, our position that the FPS standard applies to both physical and legal
protection finds support from domestic and international judicial decisions.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court's judgment interpreting the FPS
standard in U.S. treaties, protection and security includes legal entitlement
and "all rights of actions for himself or his personal representatives to
safeguard the protection, and security."590 Turning to the ICJ, never has it
affirmatively ruled that the FPS standard is limited exclusively to physical
harms. In its first case, the ICJ simply decided the FPS claim in the context
of physical harms as presented by the parties, giving no ruling in general
terms that the FPS standard was reserved for physical harms only.5 9 ' In its
second case, a chamber of the Court was also presented with a non-physical
harm, that is, the delay in the local dispute settlement procedure. It did not
reject at the outset that such delay was not within the scope of the FPS
standard. Instead, having considered all circumstances concerned, it implied
that the application of the FPS standard was not limited only to physical
harms.5 92 Had it been limited strictly to physical harms, the chamber could
have stated clearly and dismissed the claim at the beginning without
considering the circumstances concerned.593 Our next judicial support for
applying the FPS standard to legal protection is derived from the RSCT. In
its most relevant case, its chamber included both violence and various types
of harassment in the scope thereof.5 94
Given the number and outcome of investment law cases dealing with the
FPS standard, it may no longer be true that interpreting FPS clauses to protect
more specifically the physical integrity of investments against interference
by use of force is the prevailing interpretation.595 Although it might be too
early to tell in 2007 whether extending the FPS standard to legal protection
would form a new pattern in investor-state dispute settlement practice, such
a pattern is evident now. As presented earlier, there are many arbitral awards
590. Maiorano v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 275 (1909).
591. United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment,
1980 I.C.J. at 13, 14, 17, 27, 28, 32 (May 24).
592. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. at 66 (July 20).
593. See Compatiid de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, ¶ 7.4.17 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-doc
uments/ita0215.pdf But see WANG, supra note 4, at 309.
594. Rankin v. Iran, Case No. 10913, Award No. 326-10913-2, ¶ 30 (Nov. 3, 1987),
17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 135.
595. But see Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, ¶
535 (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
1272.pdf
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that applied the FPS standard to legal protection and security.5 96
While it has been said elsewhere that the seminal and earliest case
illustrative of an application of the FPS standard to legal protection and
security is CME,5 97 our research suggests otherwise. The first case
supporting such an application of the FPS standard is Lauder, which was
decided days earlier. Although the facts presented in both cases are the same,
their tribunals reached different conclusions. The Tribunal in Lauder,
though admitting that legal harms in principle could trigger the operation of
the FPS standard, found that the facts referred to did not constitute legal
harms and thus that the FPS standard was not breached. The Tribunal in
CME held the same view regarding the application of the FPS standard to
legal harms but found that such harms existed and adversely affected the
investment to the extent that it violated the FPS standard. Thus, it is
misleading to read the two cases as contradictory and representing divergent
interpretations of the FPS standard, as did the Tribunal in Suez 5 98 and the
Respondent in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic.599
Actually, they shared the same view about the applicability of the FPS
standard to legal protection. But it was their different assessments of the
facts that led them to draw different conclusions. Although legal acts, such
as law amendment and administrative proceedings, are within the
prospective reach of the FPS standard, only those deemed to be detrimental
to investments may breach the standard.
In short, it is submitted that the FPS standard covers both physical and
legal harms. And by legal harms, it is not limited to the unavailability of a
judicial system for investors to bring their claims. It includes other non-
physical acts that adversely affect investments in the prevailing
circumstances where host states fail to exercise due diligence. We do not
regard this interpretation as outlining the scope of the FPS standard too
broadly.6 00
D. Covered Perpetrators
To avoid ambiguity, it might be advisable to limit an application of the
596. See supra Part IV.D.2.
597. Parra, supra note 181, at 393.
598. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 167 (July 30, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf
599. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 4, at 3 (Sept. 28, 2007),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C8/DC694_En.pdf;
see id. ¶ 322.
600. But see Foster, supra note 105, at 1149-50.
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FPS standard only to harms perpetrated by third parties. However, so doing
is not supported by the ordinary meanings of the terms "protection" and
"security." As discussed earlier, the meanings are not limited to physical or
legal aspects of protection and security. Neither are they limited to specific
perpetrators of harms. Thus, our position here is that the FPS standard
protects and secures investments from both state organs and third parties
regardless of whether they act individually or collectively.
Limiting the FPS standard to either state organs or third parties also lacks
support from our historical analysis. Since the early history of the FPS
standard in the period of ancient Greece, foreigners have been protected
against both territorial states' and their people's actions. On the one hand,
states promised foreigners protection and security of persons and property
against their own authorities. On the other hand, androlepsia and private
reprisals serve well as historical examples of harms that were perpetrated by
local people on foreigners' fellows and property but were suppressed by
states.60 ' Our position is consistent with the 1962 OECD Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property. According to its notes and comments,
the FPS standard covers "actions by public authorities as well as others." 602
In reality, there are cases in which harms caused by states and by third parties
were presented together as previously demonstrated.60 3
E. Due Diligence
The FPS standard requires host states to exercise due diligence regarding
their own acts and acts by third parties rather than imposing strict liability
upon them.604 Regardless of whether such acts cause physical or legal harms,
we propose that due diligence is still the standard of liability. 605 We do not
recommend that the liability standard should be distinguished from the
beginning, that is to say, strict liability in case of harms perpetrated by state
organs and due diligence in case of harms inflicted by third parties. 6 06 It
should not be the case that host states bear strict liability because of the mere
fact that harms are caused by their own organs. Although host states must
abstain from conducts harmful to investments, their failure to do so should
not automatically entail strict liability. 60 7 The statement that 4he acts of state
601. See supra Part II.A.
602. OECD, supra note 184, at 9.
603. See supra Part IV.D.3.
604. Schreuer, supra note 3, at 354.
605. But see Brabandere, supra note 240, at 345-46 (noting that due diligence is not
applicable to the FPS standard in relation to legal protection and security).
606. But see Lorz, supra note 10, at 777-78.
607. But see id. at 777.
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organs that injure investment are wrongful as such without considering
whether they exercise due diligence 608 is unconvincing on its own terms and
not even consistent with Neer. If such organs exercise due diligence but
cannot avoid causing harms to investment, there should be no breach of the
FPS standard. 60 9 For example, if host states use force to suppress armed
demonstrators who occupy the investment site as a shelter or occupy a base
near the investment site, their exercise of due diligence in the prevailing
circumstance should prevent them from breaching the FPS standard, even if
the investment site is physically impaired. And investors should not be able
to claim that the FPS standard is breached. Absence of due diligence is a
contextual conclusion based on an assessment of what is "due" in the actual
context. States can fail the due diligence test without intending to cause
harms.
As to the issue of objectivity or subjectivity of due diligence, it is proposed
that a modified objective standard of due diligence should take precedence.
In so doing, we fully understand that it brings due diligence closer to
subjectivity and, more importantly, reality in the international community.
Although a full consideration of host states' varying development, stability,
and other resources as relevant for determining whether they have exercised
due diligence 6 10 could run the risk of violating the minimum standard of
treatment and deprive the FPS standard of its value, we still support a
modified objective standard if it is not below the threshold of the minimum
standard of international law. Such a threshold can be raised but cannot be
lowered by the national treatment standard and the most-favored-nation
treatment standard, whichever standard or combination of standards is likely
to produce the most beneficial results for investments. 6 1' To elaborate, only
if host states exercise extra due diligence in dealing with their own nationals'
investments, foreign investors' investments have to be dealt with in the same
manner to ensure inland parity. In cases where investments of investors
having one foreign nationality receive extra due diligence from host states,
those of other investors having a different foreign nationality will receive
that due diligence to ensure foreign parity. Thus, it does not seem correct to
assume in general terms that the FPS standard provides no more protection
than the national treatment and the most-favored-nation treatment.6 12 This
assumption is only true if the treatment accorded by both standards is not
608. Brabandere, supra note 240, at 324, 333-34, 337, 360.
609. But see id. at 345-46.
610. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 240, at 310.
611. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 80.
612. But see DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 17, at 162 (citing LESI v. Alg., Award,¶ 174 (Nov. 12, 2008).
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below the minimum standard of international law.
At this point, we would like to confirm our position that due diligence
applies to cases of both physical and legal harms. Then, in determining
whether host states exercise due diligence, a modified objective standard is
to be considered. For us, it is not convincing to argue that host states'
varying development and stability should be considered only in case of
physical protection but not in case of legal protection, including, but not
limited to, host states' failure to keep its judicial system available and
effective for investors to bring their claims. Even assuming (quod non) that
legal protection is not concerned with physical infrastructure that some host
states might lack, legal protection is obviously related to legal resources that
they might not have in their administration of justice, such as sufficiently
trained judges and other officials as well as instrumentalities for carriage of
justice. Physical harms might be more visible than legal harms, but both
types of harms could equally be inflicted by lack of resources. Physical and
legal infrastructures are equally in need of resources to build them. From
this, there is no compelling reason to consider host states' development,
stability, and resources only in the physical context but disregard them in the
legal context.613
Only in a hypothetical case in which it had been possible to build up
judicial systems in the abstract at no cost might it be true that "[d]ue process
standards like the right to be heard or to have an independent and impartial
tribunal should not depend on the economic or political situation prevailing
in a country. "614 On this point, we are in agreement with Garro that the FPS
obligation "should be measured in accordance with the range of responses
most realistic in light of the host country's judicial and legal infrastructure"
and "[t]here should, then, be a standard of due diligence on the part of the
investor - a standard which . .. is sensitive to the resources available to the
host country to provide full protection and security. "615
F. Relation to Customary International Law and Fair and Equitable
Treatment
For the sake of certainty, we recommend that the parties to investment
treaties attempt to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the FPS standard as
early in their treaty-making processes as possible. This is because, to a
certain degree, the relation between the FPS standard and others depends on
613. But see Lorz, supra note 10, at 780; Brabandere, supra note 240, at 325 (citing
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature ofthe International
Responsibility ofStates, 35 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 9 (1992)).
614. Kriebaum, supra note 240, at 403.
615. Garro, supra note 230, at 272-73.
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the exact wording used to describe them. At the outset, the parties can either
distinguish the FPS standard from the customary international law minimum
standard or regard it and the FET standard as part of the minimum
standard.616 Then, they can elaborate the scope of the FPS standard and the
FET standard. For instance, they can determine that the former only
provides investments with physical protection, together with legal remedies
for physical harms, in accordance with the principle of due diligence while
the latter grants them legal protection pursuant to the principle of due
process.
In the absence of the foregoing attempts, our position is that the treaty-
based FPS standard as such is independent of but still related to customary
international law and the FET standard. Let us start with customary
international law. As earlier noted in Part III.A.2, considerable debate has
surrounded the issue of whether the FPS standard merely restates customary
international law or is an autonomous standard additive to it.617 From a
textual perspective, we concur with Schreuer that it is hardly understandable
why the parties to the treaty would refer to "full protection and security" in
expressing their intention of granting the "minimum standard under
customary international law," especially when the same treaty also contains
another reference to general international law.618
Based on our earlier conclusion that ancient treaty provisions concerning
protection and security of aliens paved the way for the customary
international law regarding their protection and security, we will see next
how today, the FPS standard and such customary international law are
related to each other. Generally, treaties can contribute to the formation of
customary international law. It can confirm and/or modify preexisting
customary international law that is not part ofjus cogens. When the intention
of the parties is expressed in the form of treaty, it is the text of the treaty that
primarily declares such an intention. Even though we conclude that the FPS
standard overlaps with customary international law, the standard can have its
own content as conveyed by the language used to express it.
Of course, customary international law as referred to in the same treaty or
as "relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties" 6 19 shall be taken into account in interpreting the FPS standard. Thus,
616. E.g., Catharine Titi, Full Protection and Security, Arbitrary or Discriminatory
Treatment and the Invisible EU Model BIT, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 534, 544, 550
(2014) (supporting an unqualified full protection and security provision that is not linked
to the minimum international standard in the EU investment treaty model).
617. See supra Part III.A.2.
618. Schreuer, supra note 3, at 364.
619. VCLT art. 31(3), supra note 6.
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we view customary international law as a threshold not a ceiling. In our
view, it should not matter what the FPS standard was intended by states to
mean. Neither should it decide whether the FPS clause at issue was intended
to confirm or modify preexisting customary international law. Our attention
does not go to whether the treaty "intended, merely, to consolidate the pre-
existing rules of international law, or, on the contrary, it tended to innovate
by imposing on the host state a higher standard of international
responsibility." 62 0 What deserves our attention is the meaning and content
of the FPS standard conveyed by its texts. As our support, we recall the
following view of the ICJ regarding treaty interpretation: "the attitude of the
Court to a text is not, primarily, to ask itself what was this text intended to
mean (still less of course what ought it to mean, or to be made to mean), but
what does it in fact mean on its actual wording?" 621
Turning to the FET standard, we opine that its textual appearance
distinguishes it from the FPS standard. "Full protection and security" and
"fair and equitable treatment" should not be interpreted as having the same
content, especially given that they were listed separately. Still, our finding
indicates that the FET standard overlaps with the FPS standard, but it is not
yet replaced by the FPS standard in its entirety. Both standards tighten the
security of foreign investment and are protective of commercial and business
activities of investors.622 Given that the specific applications of the FET
standard have been confirmed in situations concerning stability,
transparency, investors' legitimate expectations, compliance with
contractual obligations, procedural propriety and due process, action in good
faith, and freedom from coercion and harassment,623 the overlap between the
two standards is evident. This is especially the case when the FPS standard
applies to legal harms caused by state organs. In other words, where there
are legal harms caused by state organs that breach the FPS standard, there
could be a violation of the FET standard as well. But legal harms caused by
third parties-for example, domestic private cartels against foreign
investment-that are not diligently responded to by host states should
constitute a breach of the FPS standard. In this sense, while the FPS standard
protects investment against physical and legal harms caused by state organs
and by third parties, the FET standard protects investment against legal
620. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award,¶42 (June 27, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital034
.pdf.
621. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 48 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1986) (emphasis added).
622. See Tdenicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 154-56 (May 29, 2003), 19 ISCID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004).
623. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 17, at 145-60.
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harms caused only by state organs. Thus, it is arguable whether it is correct
to maintain that the FPS standard is more restrictive in scope than the FET
standard,624 especially from a historical perspective. Bearing in mind the
relation between the FPS and FET standards, it is understandable if tribunals
wish to avoid dealing with both standards in tandem by referring to the
principle of procedural economy. Still, if they insist on addressing them
both, they might be able to do so consistently with the principle of
effectiveness. To find that the FPS and FET standards partly overlap is not
the same as to deprive the FET standard of its meaning entirely.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current health of the international investment law jurisprudence on
the FPS standard is not flawless-as is usually the case with jurisprudence
on other standards. Neither is it irreversibly frail. The FPS standard is
notably marked by a sharp division between two extremes: on one side, it
has been limited to physical harms; on the other side, it has been extended to
legal harms. Incentivized thereby, this Article strives to propose a preferred
interpretation and application of the FPS standard.
Starting with its historical development, we find that the seed of the FPS
standard dates back to ancient Greece, if not earlier. Initially, the concept of
full protection and security has already been tied to both physical and legal
protection and security for foreigners. Scholarly debates and judicial
decisions at both the domestic and international levels lend support for our
position. Then, we turn to international investment tribunals and find both
proponents and opponents of the position. Having correlated past decisions
with conditions that affected them, and having considered that the context of
those conditions has changed materially, we conclude that an interpretation
of the FPS standard to cover legal harms is preferred. In prior political and
commercial contexts surrounding the making of FCN treaties, for example,
foreign investment was incidentally protected. Even with such incidental
protection, legal protection was granted. Thus, in the context of
contemporary international investment, in which investment treaties have
been concluded to specifically protect investment, it is even more justifiable
to interpret "protection and security" in accordance with the VCLT rules to
cover both physical and legal harms caused by state organs and third parties,
either acting individually or collectively.
Regarding the relation between the treaty-based FPS standard and
customary international law, the former can be more far-reaching and has the
latter as its threshold. As a lex specialis, its scope is not entirely determined
624. But see MONTT, supra note 17, at 302 n.40.
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by customary international law as a lex generalis. It can go beyond physical
and some legal protection already embedded in customary international law.
Still, the observation of the treaty-based FPS standard is measured by due
diligence, as is the case with the customary international law duty to provide
aliens with full protection and security. In our view, due diligence is to be
determined in accordance with a modified objective standard, considering
host states' level of development, capacity, stability, and resources.
Although the FPS standard is a distinct treaty standard, it overlaps with other
standards, especially with the FET standard when the FPS standard is
considered in the context of legal harms. Whether to deal with such overlap
or to ignore it is an open issue and a matter of policy that is not without
supporting principles, that is, the principles of effectiveness and procedural
economy, respectively. Another issue that can be further debated is whether
we should put a limit on legal harms covered by the FPS standard. For
instance, the categorization of legal harms that should be within the scope of
either the FPS standard or the FET standard can be called into question.
